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Abstract:  Belgium is notoriously absent from the World Wealth and Income Database 
(http://wid.world/), the rapidly expanding international source of comparable data for 
research on income and wealth inequality. This paper reports on a first attempt to fill this 
gap. We correct and complete published data on net taxable incomes for the period 1990-
2013 to comply with the standards set by the WID database, as expressed in the population 
control and the income control.  
Our results show that inferring evolutions of the income share of the top 10% or 1% from 
published tables of net taxable income is highly misleading. After correction, there is little 
evidence that top income shares in Belgium have increased during the last 25 years. In 
contrast to similar analyses for the UK, US, Germany, and to a lesser extent France and 
the Netherlands, we do not find a clear increase in the income share of the top decile. 
Also, the significant increase in the income share for the top one percent in many 
countries, cannot easily be replicated for Belgium. However, some caution is needed. The 
correction for missing income, preliminary though it is, points to the crucial role played 
by both our definition of the income reference total and of changing definitions and/or 
conventions in the National Accounts. 
JEL-codes: D31, D63, H20 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent revival of empirical research on the evolution of income inequality in rich countries is only 
partially matched by comparable research or insights in Belgium.2 At the launch of the refreshed and 
expanded website of the World Wealth and Income Database (http://wid.world/) in December 2017, 
Belgium’s place on the rapidly filling world map of countries present in this internationally comparable 
dataset of income and wealth inequality, remained uncoloured, indicating absence of reliable 
comparable information.3 This paper reports on a first attempt to fill this gap. 
There are of course papers and books which describe and analyse the evolution of Belgian income 
inequality. The Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy (CSB) at the University of Antwerp has a 
long tradition of charting Belgian income inequality, going back at least to one of the first books by 
Deleeck in 1977. According to the latest estimates from CSB based on survey data, Belgian income 
inequality was rather stable between 1985 and the late 2000s (Horemans et al. 2011, Table 2 on p.5, 
and Van Rie and Marx 2014). Some degree of caution is needed, since the estimates are based on three 
different surveys, which use different income concepts and survey methodologies.4 If we restrict the 
evolution to subperiods covered by one and the same survey methodology, inequality of equivalised 
disposable income was either declining (from 0.281 in 1993 to 0.259 in 2000), or stable (from 0.255 in 
2004 to 0.258 in 2007). Only between 1985 and 1997 was there a rise to be noted, with a rise in the 
Gini coefficient from 0.220 in 1985 to 0.233 in 1997. Also, measures of relative income poverty, like 
the equivalised disposable income being below the poverty threshold of 60 per cent of the median, 
indicate a stable trend. Van Rie and Marx (2014) conclude that the Belgian income inequality has 
remained remarkably stable over the past thirty years. That is noteworthy, given the political and 
economic shifts of the past decades and the fact that Belgium ranks among the most globalised countries 
in the world. This conclusion is echoed by the OECD (2008, 2011, 2015), which also reports only a 
minor change in the Belgian Gini from 0.257 in 1983 to 0.264 in 2011. 5 
Interesting though these results may be, they are not really fit to be integrated in the WID database for 
two main reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, the income concept underpinning the results described 
above is disposable household income, which is income after taxes paid and transfers received, 
                                                     
2  A non exhaustive overview of the rapidly expanding empirical research contains Atkinson and Piketty 
(2007, 2010), Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011), Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2013), Nolan et 
al. (2014), OECD (2008, 2011, 2015), Roine and Waldenström (2015) and evidently the publicly 
available estimates of many countries in the World Wealth and Income Database (http://wid.world/). 
3  As far as top income shares are concerned, other EU-countries still absent in the WID database and/or 
website are: Austria, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Moreover, the Belgian absence is 
not limited to the WID database, but also in recent top income analysis by OECD (Förster, Llena-Nozal 
and Nafilyan 2014). 
4  The surveys are Sociaal Economisch Panel (SEP) for 1985, 1988, 1992 and 1997, European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) yearly for the years 1993-2000, and Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC) yearly since 2004. 
5  According to the OECD (2015, Figure 1.3), Belgium is one of the few countries together with the 
Netherlands, France, Greece and Turkey where income inequality did not rise substantially in the last 
three decades. The OECD reports an increase of the Gini for 22 OECD-countries from 0.289 in 1985 to 
0.318 in 2013, with large increases in the US (0.340 to 0.401), Germany (0.251 to 0.291), the UK (0.309 
to 0.344), but also Sweden (0.198 to 0.274), be it from a much lower level. 
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registered for a sociological household. By contrast, the WID data primarily focus on income before 
taxes and transfers. Secondly, most of the data in the WID framework originate from administrative 
datasets of taxable income extracted from the fiscal forms entered by taxpayers. The above results for 
Belgium are all based on income reporting by respondents in surveys, such as SILC since 2004 (the 
European wide Survey on Income and Living Conditions). EUROSTAT, international institutions like 
OECD, IMF or World Bank and specialised think tanks like the Luxembourg Income Study mostly 
rely on these same datasets of disposable incomes obtained from surveys, in order to study income 
inequality. Not surprisingly therefore and as noted above for OECD, they also reach the same 
conclusion: income inequality in Belgium has not noticeably changed in the last three decades.6 
Therefore, it is all the more surprising that the public at large, journalists and opinion makers, and many 
politicians seem to take it for granted that also in Belgium, like in many other Western countries, income 
inequality is on the rise. Illustrative of this is the series published in the newspaper De Standaard in 
2014, under the heading “De kloof” (“The Gap”). The conclusions from the newspaper were outspoken: 
“as in so many other countries, inequality in Belgium is also on the rise”. The reasons for the divergence 
of the public perception from the results cited above can be manifold. One reason might be that—at 
least in the public debate—statements about inequality are often not clearly distinguished from 
statements about poverty. Secondly, studies use different measures of inequality—Gini, Theil, income 
shares—the different properties of which do not always trickle down into popularisations of results of 
inequality studies. Furthermore it is unclear whether these different measures and their properties do 
indeed capture the intuitions of what the public at large understands by ‘inequality’.7 Finally, the way 
in which the inequality is analysed also plays a crucial role. Wage inequality, measured between 
individuals, may evolve differently from inequality in disposable income measured at the level of the 
sociological household. There is no prior reason to assume that inequality of the latter evolves in line 
with inequality of gross income of the household, when gross incomes are composed of gross earnings 
of all individuals active on the labour market, of gross replacement incomes and of gross incomes from 
capital. 
As far as this income concept is concerned, the WID project has chosen income before taxes from the 
beginning, preferably measured as fiscal income filed by income tax filers.8 As is clearly spelt out by 
Roine and Waldenström (2015), this WID choice is a return to the original idea of Kuznets (1953, 
                                                     
6  Compared to the studies mentioned in the main text which are mostly based on survey data of disposable 
incomes, Valenduc (2017) is the exception, describing the evolution of Belgian inequality since 1982 
based on administrative fiscal data. However, contrary to our approach, explained in Section 3, the results 
of Valenduc (2017) are based on the concept of taxable income after deductions, and the large changes 
in enrolment at the bottom of the distribution are corrected by trying to mimic the situation of the 
beginning of the period, whereas we adopt the concept of an external population control total of the WID 
framework. 
7  The most obvious example is the scale or translation invariance of an inequality measure, embodying 
different views on how additional income of a growing pie has to be distributed to keep inequality 
unchanged (or how income losses have to be allocated when the pie is shrinking). 
8  In WID language a distinction is made between ‘fiscal income’, which is taxable income before any 
deduction is applied, and ‘taxable income’, which is the income concept on which the rates of the — 
mostly — progressive personal income tax system is applied. In Belgian administrative files (like IPCAL) 
taxable income is referred to as ‘net taxable income’, where the adjective ‘net’ refers to the application 
of deductions (and hence not to the concept of disposable income after taxes). 
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1955), revived and extended first by Piketty (2001, 2003).9 The main ideas of Kuznets—and the 
underlying motivation of its revival by Piketty—were that income tax data: 
1. allow for long run comparisons of inequality changes (since income taxes have been with 
us since the late 19th or early 20th centuries in most Western countries); 
2. have to be corrected for the income which is not present in the tax files (since not all income 
has to be declared); this is called the ‘income control’-issue; 
3. have to be corrected for the population which is not present in the tax files (since not all 
people have to file); this is called the ‘population control’-issue. 
The backbone of the WID project has been to apply this ‘Kuznets-methodology’ as consistently as 
possible across different countries, to obtain comparable series of top income shares for as many 
countries as possible. The two volumes of Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010) were the first outcome of 
this consistency, containing estimates for 22 countries. These are now followed by the launch of the 
new WID website which contains series for 57 countries from all over the world.  
This paper makes a first attempt to include Belgium in this project by using income tax data to assess 
the change in the income shares of the top 1% and top 10% from 1990 to 2013. We are aware that this 
rather short period, contradicts the first of the three Kuznets-elements above (the long run analysis). 
But of course we hope that all is not lost, that is delayed. In this paper we mainly report on the 
application of population and income control to Belgian data for the cited period to investigate how 
crucial these corrections are for assessing the evolution of income inequality. This boils down to three 
major issues. First, tabulated and publicly available information concerns “net taxable income (NTI)”, 
whereas the WID standard is gross taxable income (GTI). The difference between the two concepts 
consists of the numerous deductions applied to the filed gross taxable income, to arrive at the net taxable 
income which enters the progressive rate scheme (see section 3.2.2 for details). The gross income 
concept is not published, at least not in recent years.10 Second, according to the Belgian tax legislation, 
most capital income is taxed by a liberating withholding tax. This means that these incomes no longer 
have to be declared on the tax form, leading to a serious lack of information on an important income 
component. Third, the actual inclusion of tax forms with zero net taxable incomes in the original 
administrative dataset of fiscal forms (IPCAL) has changed drastically over time. The necessity of these 
corrections is illustrated in section 2, where we give some preliminary prima facie evidence about the 
dangers of using uncorrected published tables with income tax data to analyse the evolution of income 
inequality. In section 3 we then describe the two essential ingredients of the WID framework, i.e. the 
population control (section 3.1), and the income control (section 3.2), and how we applied them to the 
Belgian context. Section 0 contains the main results. Limiting the description of inequality in this paper 
to the evolution of top income shares, we describe how the top 1% and top 10% income shares of gross 
                                                     
9  The study of inequality based on large representative household surveys, ideally even constructed as 
panel-data, could — in some sense, and notwithstanding their undisputed valued added in terms of newly 
developed econometric techniques and conceptual frameworks — be viewed as a bit of a ‘detour’ of the 
‘wishlist’ of Kuznets (1953). Indeed, since these large micro-surveys only became available during the 
last decades, they “shifted attention away from some issues, and in particular questions regarding long-
run developments” (Roine and Waldenström 2015, p. 471). 
10  In the published tables of earlier years, we find information on amounts that have been deducted. 
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income might have evolved over the last 25 years. We also compare this evolution to some other 
comparable countries. 
A final remark concerns the fact that methodological choices made in this paper do not necessarily 
reflect discussions and moves made in the recent widening of the WID framework from a ‘top income’ 
literature to the broader framework of Distributional National Accounts (DINA). This DINA research 
agenda aims to produce annual estimates of the distribution of income and wealth that are consistent 
with the macroeconomic national accounts; see Alvaredo et al (2017) for a summary. Our paper more 
closely mimics the papers belonging to the first wave in this by now abundant literature of estimating 
top income shares based on fiscal data (and brought together in the two volumes by Atkinson and 
Piketty 2007 and 2010). But given the delay in the work on Belgian fiscal data we thought that it was 
useful to catch up first with the estimates of ‘top income’ shares based on micro data of fiscal incomes, 
rather than further postponing any release of comparable Belgian research. In the conclusion we outline 
different research tracks which necessarily have to follow this first attempt. 
2. WHAT DO WE (NOT) LEARN FROM PUBLISHED BELGIAN DATA AND WHY? 
On its website http://economie.fgov.be/, Statistics Belgium makes data of filed income tax forms 
available in different tabulated forms (deciles, percentiles for the top decile, fixed brackets). Although 
the data now covers the time span 2005-2015, we obtained analogous tables for income years going 
back to the income year 1977.11 These tabulations are generated from the fiscal database IPCAL, which 
contains microdata of the whole population of administrative tax return data. At first sight, therefore, it 
cannot be the unavailability of income tax data which explains the absence of Belgium in the WID 
dataset. 
Indeed, these datasets have been used on several occasions to make statements about the evolution of 
income inequality in Belgium during the past four decades. Statistics Belgium itself publishes income 
shares of different income groups. They are based on the central concept in the fiscal dataset of ‘net 
taxable income’ for a ‘fiscal unit’.12 The newspaper series in De Standaard in 2014, cited above, was 
also based on this publicly available information. However, direct calculation of income shares on this 
information is — to put it mildly — not without its problems. We illustrate this by showing three graphs 
in the next three subsections, each trying to answer a straightforward question by using these 
uncorrected data. 
2.1 EVOLUTION OF INCOME SHARES AT FIRST GLANCE 
We first show income shares when only using the total net taxable income of the published tables in 
the denominator. figure 1 shows the evolution of this income share for three income groups: the bottom 
                                                     
11  The last release dates from October 2017, which made the tables available for the income year 2015. The 
website mentions that these data are available up to income year 1976, but the earliest income year that 
we obtained was 1977. 
12  Until some years ago, Statistics Belgium also displayed a steeply upward sloping time series of Gini-
coefficients on its website. This Gini coefficient was calculated on the strictly positive net taxable 
incomes (omitting the many zero entries in the data file). At the time of writing this graph of the Gini-
coefficient based on net taxable income is no longer displayed, but it can still be found e.g. in Figure 6.1 
in OECD (2012). 
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decile, indicated as D1 and displayed as a red line on the right vertical axis; the top decile, denoted as 
D10, displayed as a blue line with squares and measured on the left axis; and the top percentile, denoted 
as P100, and displayed as the grey line with circles on the left axis. All data underlying the graphs are 
also tabulated in the Appendix 1. For figure 1, the details of all decile shares can be found in Table 3 in 
Appendix 1, and the details of the percentiles of the top decile in Table 4. 
The evolution of the share of the top decile suggests that in Belgium the share of the top has increased 
since about 1984. Starting from a share of 33.1% in 1973, it reached a minimum of 25.4% in 1984, but 
rose uninterruptedly to 32.1% in 2007. In the aftermath of the financial crisis and the two recessions 
triggered by it, the top decile fell slightly fell back from 32.1% to 31.4% in 2013. The final two years 
display a minor increase to 31.7% in 2015. The evolution of the share of the top 1% of net taxable 
income follows a similar pattern: a substantial decrease from the start of the series—in this case 1977—
from 7.5% to 5.1% in 1984, and then a restoration of the initial share up to 7.8% in 2007. Since 2007 
the top percentile income share in net taxable income remains more or less stable (7.7% in 2015). 
FIGURE 1: SHARE OF TOP (D10) AND BOTTOM (D1) DECILE AND OF TOP PERCENTILE (P100) BASED ON 
PUBLISHED DATA OF NET TAXABLE INCOME FOR THE PERIOD 1973-2013 
 
Source:  own calculations based on the tables with net taxable income for deciles 1 to 10 and percentiles 91 to 100 
obtained from Statistics Belgium (website 2005-2015; obtained upon request for 1977-2004). For the years 
1973, 1975 and 1976 we obtained the decile shares from De Standaard. The year 1974 was absent in that file, 
and we simply linearly interpolated 1974 from the data of 1973 and 1975. 
However, the display of the evolution of the income share of the bottom decile can but alarm us about 
the underlying data. The bumps in several single years are illustrative of the vulnerability of 
administrative datasets of income tax data, which are, naturally, dependent on changes in the tax 
legislation. Between 1981 and 1982 the share of the bottom 10% jumped from 1.3% to 2%, and 
something similar happened between 1991 and 1992 (from 1.5% to 2%). The jump in 1982 is probably 
due to changes in the tax treatment of replacement incomes, which from 1982 onwards, switched from 
a deduction to a tax reduction. The deductions, applied before 1982, lowered net taxable income, which 
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is calculated net of deductions. The replacement of the deductions by tax reductions hence increased 
the registered net taxable income, although gross income and income after taxes might have been 
unaffected. In 1992 also, deductions of gross taxable income were transformed into tax reductions (i.e. 
the deductions for life insurance premiums, for group insurances (supplementary pension schemes) and 
for the part of capital repayment in the mortgage of an owner-occupied house), although it is doubtful 
whether this might have been of considerable importance for the bottom decile. Thus, the administrative 
decision to start with the enrolment of the (small) taxable incomes of student jobs in the IPCALfile, 
might be more relevant to explain the jump in 1992.13 
Anyhow, it seems as if analysing shares in net taxable income to study the evolution of income 
inequality, is a non-starter, since the results will be affected too much by changes in tax legislation, 
which affects the content of concepts like net taxable income. The least we should aim for is to try to 
work with gross taxable income to neutralise these changes in tax legislation. Only then can we answer 
the question of whether the decline of the share of the bottom decile from its maximum of 2% in 1992 
to 1.7% in 2000, the further rapid acceleration of this decline during the period 2000-2004, and the 
levelling off of the decrease to a low of 0.5% in 2010 (which is a share four times smaller than two 
decades earlier) captures a ‘real’ phenomenon, or is an artefact of the data.  
2.2 GROWTH IN TAXABLE INCOME 
The hazardousness of relying on the published net taxable income data is confirmed by figure 2, which 
displays year by year growth of net taxable income (for details see Table 6 in the appendix). In the 
upper panel we show the growth rate of net taxable income for the whole population of fiscal 
households, and for income subgroups (the bottom decile, the top decile, and the top percentile). In the 
bottom panel we compare growth in total net taxable income for the fiscal population to growth of 
nominal GDP. 
The capriciousness of the growth rate of net taxable income for the bottom decile (+80.7% in 1982, 
+43.7% in 1992, but -9.3%, -15.5% and -31.2% in 2002, 2003, and 2004 respectively) again betrays 
changes in the tax legislation which have either incited people with low taxable incomes to file when 
they had no incentive to do so before, and/or changes in deduction possibilities that have produced 
more low net taxable incomes. The outspoken increases in taxable income in the bottom decile in 1982 
and 1992 confirm the explanations already listed above when discussing the share of the bottom decile 
in figure 1. The significant decrease of net taxable income in the period 2001-2004 probably has to do 
with personal income tax reform in that period (the so-called Reynders reform) which turned the tax 
reduction for dependent children into a genuine, i.e. refundable, tax credit. Taxpayers who had not been 
enrolled before, were now enrolled, because otherwise they would not get their reimbursement. 
The behaviour of the growth rate of net taxable income at the top of the distribution is at least as 
worrying. Net taxable income of the top 1% decreased (e.g. by 4.4% in 1984), but was then followed 
by a 10.4% increase in 1985. An increase of 12.2% in 1996 is followed by 0.7% in 1997. To explain 
this capricious movement at the top of the distribution is less straightforward than for changes at the 
                                                     
13  We are grateful to Christian Valenduc of the Ministry of Finance for providing us with at least some 
explanations for the observed kinks and jumps in Figures 1, 2 and 3. 
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bottom, but it is nonetheless difficult to imagine that this volatility would only reflect real changes in 
taxable incomes for this subgroup.14 
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF GROWTH OF NET TAXABLE INCOME FOR DECILE 1, AND PERCENTILE 100 WITH 
AVERAGE GROWTH OF NET TAXABLE INCOME IN PUBLISHED DATA 
 
 
Source:  own calculations based on the information on net taxable income as explained in the note of figure 1. 
                                                     
14  In the period 1981-1984 social security contributions for incomes exceeding 3 million euros have been 
introduced as part of the fiscal consolidation plan in that period. Since net taxable income is an income 
concept net of social security contributions, the decrease of taxable income at the top, might be a genuine 
effect here. 
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The bottom panel of figure 2 illustrates that the comparison of growth in net taxable income with the 
growth of nominal GDP is also mixed. From the start of the period until about 1982, net taxable income 
grew faster than nominal GDP. In 1982 the difference in growth rates even amounted to 7.2%, with 
nominal GDP increasing by 8.2%, and net taxable income by 15.4% (whereas the growth in NTI fell 
back to 2.3% in 1983).15 This was followed by a period until 2007 in which taxable income mostly 
grew slower than nominal GDP, except in certain years (1991-1992, 1995-1996 and 2001-2003). One 
of the crucial elements in the Kuznets and WID methodology is to at least compare aggregate net 
taxable income with national accounts aggregates (which, as we will show below, will of course not be 
nominal GDP, but a concept relating to household income). 
2.3 THE NUMBER OF FISCAL FORMS WITH ZERO NET TAXABLE INCOME 
Finally, figure 3 (and Table 5 in the appendix) shows the number of tax forms with a net taxable income 
equal to zero. Net taxable income can be zero, either because a taxpayer filed a gross taxable income 
of zero (and had an incentive or an obligation to do that), or because with a strictly positive gross taxable 
income, deductions were large enough to reduce the corresponding net taxable income to zero. All 
calculations by Statistics Belgium are only based on records which have a strictly positive net taxable 
income, but Statistics Belgium also reports the number of zeroes in the file. That is what is shown in 
figure 3. Although aggregate net taxable income is of course unaffected by tax payers who have a net 
taxable income equal to zero, the boundaries of income groups might be severely affected by the 
changing presence (or absence) of zeroes in the income tax dataset. 
The conclusion from figure 3 is still more outspoken than in the previous two figures: only changes in 
tax legislation and/or administrative practice can explain the rapid and sudden increase of the number 
of zeroes between 2001 (27 586) and 2004 (473 982). Again the change to refundable tax credits 
partially explains the observation. Previous to the existence of refundable tax credits, a tax officer who 
got a tax form from an unemployed person who filed a strictly positive unemployment benefit, but who 
had to pay no taxes due to the deductions, was not enrolled. Once the tax reduction became refundable, 
this tax officer effectively enrolled this person.16 In 2002 the tax administration therefore decided to 
start the systematic enrolment of all possible fiscal units, even if the expected net taxable income would 
be zero. 
The continued increase from 2004 to 2010 (up to 664 674 zeroes in 2010) might be testimony to the 
gradual implementation of the decision to enrol everybody in 2002. We have however no immediate 
explanation for the significant decline of the number of zeroes after the peak in 2010 (the number of 
zeroes dropped by nearly 90 000 in 2011). 
In summary: both the concept of net taxable income, and the form in which the tables are produced (by 
omitting the zeroes) hinder a robust analysis of the evolution of income shares over time. This all 
                                                     
15  As explained above, part of the explanation for this discrepancy might be found in the transition from tax 
deductions to reductions of the tax liability itself. When the income data for 2014 was released at the end 
of 2015, Statistics Belgium explicitly pointed to the transformation of remaining tax deductions into tax 
reductions in the context of the regional split of personal income taxes due to the 6th institutional reform, 
to explain the growth of net taxable income in 2014. 
16  It was even possible that, based on experience of previous years, tax officers decided not to send a tax 
form to fiscal units of whom they anticipated that they would not be liable for paying a positive tax. 
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supports the fact that external totals for the reference population and the control income are needed for 
Belgium, something discussed and developed in the following sections. 
FIGURE 3: EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF TAX FORMS WITH ZERO NET TAXABLE INCOME IN PUBLICLY 
AVAILABLE INCOME TAX DATA 
 
Source:  series obtained from Statistics Belgium starting in 1990. 
3. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WORLD WEALTH AND INCOME DATABASE (WID) 
In this section we mainly follow Atkinson (2007) to explain the choices we made to construct a 
reference total for population and for aggregate income which are as independent as possible from the 
changing tax legislation. As noted at the end of the introduction, this is mainly inspired by the choices 
made in the original wave of WID work, and does not necessarily fit with the latest proposals for 
integration of the work into the DINAframework as discussed by Alvaredo et al. (2017). 
3.1 THE POPULATION CONTROL 
figure 3 made clear how administrative decisions about enrolment in the micro-dataset with fiscal forms 
have a huge impact on the ‘bottom’ of the distribution of net taxable income. Statistics Belgium takes 
this into account by removing the zero net taxable incomes when calculating income shares for 
subgroups. As far as the aggregate income in the numerator of income shares is concerned, this is of 
course an innocuous operation. But it does influence the composition of the different income subgroups, 
such as deciles and percentiles. Moreover, since we will try to estimate shares based on taxable income 
before deductions (called ‘fiscal income’ in WID), some — many? — zero taxable incomes are not 
effectively zero, but follow from a strictly positive taxable income before deductions. In section 3.2 we 
describe how we reconstruct fiscal income (before deductions) starting from observed net taxable 
income. Here we focus on the reference population. 
The reference for the population is determined as the maximum possible number of fiscal households. 
We determined this maximum by starting from the age structure in EUROSTAT demographic data, 
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and selecting the population of all individuals strictly older than 15 years (see column 4 in Table 5 in 
the appendix). Since fiscal households consist either of married or cohabitating couples, or of singles, 
we subtract from the population of individuals the number of married or cohabitating couples (column 5 
in Table 5 in the appendix). The result is depicted as the red line in figure 4, and is our population 
control total, with which we can compare the actual number of fiscal households in the administrative 
data. 
FIGURE 4: EVOLUTION OF FISCAL UNITS, ZERO NET TAXABLE INCOMES AND COMPARISON WITH 
POPULATION CONTROL  
 
Source:  own calculations based on EUROSTAT demographic data, and the number of tax returns published by 
Statistics Belgium. We only have information on the number of zero net taxable incomes since 1990. 
The actual number of tax returns, both with strictly positive net taxable income and the zeroes, is 
depicted as the dark blue line in figure 4. The green line represents the number tax forms with a strictly 
positive net taxable income. The largest distance between the number of strictly positive net taxable 
incomes and the reference total was a bit less than 30% of the reference population in 1994. We have 
therefore, for comparison purposes only, also drawn a line for 70% of the reference population of fiscal 
households. The administrative decision to gradually enrol all potential tax filers in the dataset from 
2002 onwards is revealed here as the widening gap between the blue and the green curve. Before 2002, 
taxpayers with zero net taxable income belonged to the red zone (the difference between the reference 
population and the actual number of administrative tax records). 
In 2005 the actual number of tax forms (including the zeroes) nearly exactly matched our estimated 
reference population. But, remarkably, between 2005 and 2010, the number of tax forms even exceeded 
the reference total (which was constructed as the maximal possible number of tax returns). We see two 
possible reasons. Either we underestimated the maximal size of population of fiscal units (e.g. by 
overestimating the number of married or cohabitating couples). Or, some minors (15 years or younger) 
file a tax form independently from their parent(s). This might be the case if they have their own income, 
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such as an alimony directly paid to the child, which will be declared on a separate tax form.17 This 
comparison of the actual number of tax forms with the reference population nonetheless deserves 
further scrutiny in future research, also because we have no immediate explanation for the recent drop 
in the ratio of actual tax forms over the reference population (in 2012 it had dropped back to 95.5% 
from 101.4% in 2010). 
To correct the published net taxable income data for the varying number of zeroes, we have contented 
ourselves in this paper with filling the bottom of the distribution with zero gross taxable incomes until 
the gap between the actual number of tax returns and the reference population was closed for each year. 
As mentioned in footnote 6 in the introduction, this is one of the important differences with 
Valenduc (2017). To remove the effect of changes in the practice of enrolment, Valenduc (2017) tries 
to keep the effective enrolment fixed as it was in the beginning of the period, by removing low and zero 
incomes in later periods. In our view this introduces a quite ad hoc and arbitrary reference point in time. 
We prefer an external population reference total which itself evolves over time. Our inserting of zero 
gross taxable incomes at the bottom evidently has no impact on the income aggregates. These are 
corrected anyway, as explained in section 3.2. But it does redefine the income groups, by changing the 
quantile value, i.e. the income value where a decile or percentile starts. 
3.2 INCOME CONTROL 
Income shares are calculated with aggregate income in the denominator. To dispose of a consistent 
aggregate income series is therefore crucial in the description of the evolution of income shares. 
Section 2 sufficiently showed that, even for the relatively brief history since 1977, the uncorrected total 
of published net taxable income, cannot play this role. This is mainly due to (changes in) tax legislation 
and hence this deficiency will only become more pronounced when, in future work, we will try to 
expand the analysis to previous time periods.  
From the outset, the Kuznets-approach and its revival tried to reconcile the choice for income tax data 
as the main data source with the aim to obtain a description of the distribution of a broader income 
concept than the one available in the income tax data. The construction of the preferred reference total 
of income will always depend on the research questions one wants to answer, and in essence two routes 
can be followed. Either one starts from the income tax data, and adds missing income to arrive at the 
broader income concept. Or one starts from this broader concept and identifies the elements which 
make up for the difference with the income recorded in the income tax data. These two possibilities are 
summarised in figure 5, a slightly adapted version of a table in Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011), 
which already appeared in Atkinson (2007). 
When starting on top of the table, the national accounts aggregate, called ‘personal sector income’ 
(row 1) plays the leading role. It is mentioned separately here from the more relevant ‘household sector 
income’ in row 3 since in some countries only the macro-economic aggregate from row (1) is available 
as the sum of the national accounts sectors S14 and S15. In Belgium though, the information on row 3 
is separately available in the form of the account of sector S14. 
                                                     
17  Other income of minors (e.g. from property or from inherited financial assets) is added into the fiscal 
form of the parents. We are grateful to Christian Valenduc for clarifying this. 
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FIGURE 5: STEPS FROM MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATE ‘PERSONAL SECTOR INCOME’ TO OBSERVED NET 
TAXABLE INCOME OF FILERS IN PERSONAL INCOME TAX RECORDS 
(1) Personal sector total income 
(2)  minus Non-household income (Non-profit institutions such as charities) 
(3) Household sector total income 
(4)  minus 
Items not included in tax base (e.g employers’ social security contributions 
and—in some countries—employees’ social security contributions, imputed rent 
on owner-occupied houses and non-taxable transfer payments) 
(5) Reference Income: Household gross income returnable to tax authorities 
(6)  minus Taxable income not declared by filers in the personal income tax declaration 
(7)  minus Taxable income of non-filers 
(8) Declared gross taxable income of filers 
(9)  minus deductions of gross taxable income 
(10) Published net taxable income 
Source:  Based on Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011), p. 17, also available in Atkinson (2007), p. 30.  
Row numbers and the addition in the description of row (6)  ‘in the personal income tax declaration’ is ours. 
We also added rows (9) and (10). 
The income reference we have used to determine how much income is missing in the published taxable 
income, is found on row 5. It differs from row 3 by subtracting income items which are not—and have 
never been—included in the tax base, such as social security contributions (both from employers and 
employees), but also non-taxable transfer payments such as child allowances, study grants, social 
minima, etc.. Note that imputed rent on owner-occupied houses, (mentioned in figure 5 as not belonging 
to the tax base), effectively belongs to the personal income tax base in Belgium, be it that the estimation 
of imputed rent is way below the market rental value. Hence, in the construction of the income control 
for Belgium, we have integrated the national accounts estimate of owner occupied housing into the 
income control. Due to the liberating withholding tax on income from financial assets, row (6) consists 
of most of the income from financial assets accruing to natural persons. In fact, personal income tax 
files in Belgium mainly provide information on wage and salary earnings and on taxable transfer 
incomes, which are mostly replacement incomes such as pensions, unemployment benefits, and 
sickness and invalidity payments. The other differences between the income reference in row (5) and 
the taxable income we observe in the published tables consist of the income of non-filers and of the 
difference between gross taxable income and the published net taxable income after deductions have 
been applied. 
The final aim of embedding the income distribution analysis in a comprehensive national accounts 
perspective is to describe the distribution of the income control total across households or individuals 
in the population. This consist of two distinct steps: 
(a) calculate the income reference from the national accounts (calculating row (5) in figure 5); 
we describe this in detail in Section 3.2.1 below; 
(b) when starting from administrative files, such as published net taxable income in row (10) 
in figure 5, complement this published taxable income with information on the magnitude 
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and the distribution of rows (6), (7) and (9) to bring it as closely as possible to the income 
concept of row (5).  
In this paper we only partially succeeded in reconstructing the distribution of the income control itself. 
As we will describe in in Section 3.2.2., we were able to move up from row (10) to row (9) by adding 
back applied deductions to the net taxable income at the levels of individual tax filers. We hence recover 
total ‘declared gross taxable income of filers’ in row (8), and also its distribution. However, we have 
no information about row (6) and (7) at the level of individuals or households. This confines the analysis 
in this paper to a description of the evolution of the income we are missing, the latter being defined as 
the difference between the income control in row (5) and the total declared gross income in row (8). 
Only by making additional assumptions about how this missing income might be distributed, could we 
progress further in the distributional analysis. We now discuss each of these two steps in turn in 
sections. 
3.2.1 Calculation of the income reference from the national accounts 
Two important choices underlie the construction of the income control in this paper. First, we base the 
income control total on national accounts aggregates within institutional sector S14 (i.e. the household 
sector) only. That means that balances of primary incomes in other sectors do not belong to the income 
control.18 Certainly for the balance of primary income in sectors S11 and S12, also known as 
‘undistributed profits’ or ‘retained earnings’ one might put forward arguments to integrate this non 
distributed part of valued added – in full or partially – in the income reference total.  
Second, we construct the income control as the sum of separate entries in the account of sector S14. 
Table 1 illustrates – for income year 2013 – how we have constructed the income control based on 
these national accounts itemisation in sector S14. We distinguish four income components: wages and 
salaries, replacement incomes, income from property and income from financial assets. For each 
aggregate in the national accounts, we indicate whether we include it  in the income control (“+” in the 
column with header ‘Role in IC’), subtract it (“-”), or neglect it (“0”). For example since wages and 
salaries (code D.11, €150 331 million  in 2013) are exclusive of employer social security contributions, 
but inclusive of employee social security contributions, we subtract the employee social security 
contributions (code D.613, €23 655 million  in 2013). This illustrates how we still aim at a reference 
total which is aligned with or determined by tax legislation. In some countries social (employee) 
security contributions do effectively appear on the tax form, but are deductible. In that case they could 
be included in the construction of ‘fiscal income’. This again illustrates how necessary the 
standardisation accomplished by the WID project is, if one wants to obtain intercountry and 
intertemporal comparability. 
 
                                                     
18  The other sectors being S11 (non-financial corporations), S12 (financial corporations), S13 (general 
government) and S15 (non-profit institutions serving households). We consider the sum of net balances 
of primary incomes (B5n in the national accounts) over the five institutional sectors as ‘net national 
income’, NNI. 
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TABLE 1: CONSTRUCTION INCOME CONTROL ON BELGIAN NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AGGREGATES SECTOR S14 - ILLUSTRATION FOR 2013 IN MILLION € 
Description Code SUT Account Account Description Role in IC value Fiscal Data in mio € % NA 
Labour Income components in National Accounts  
Wages and salaries D.11 Resources II.1.2 Allocation of primary income account + 150 331   
Households' actual social contributions D.613 Uses II.2 Secondary distrib. of income account - 23 655   
Households' social contributions supplements D.614 Uses II.2 Secondary distri. of income account - 2 241   
Gross mixed income B.3g Resources II.1.2 Allocation of primary income account + 25 362   
Consumption fixed capital on gross mixed income P51C2   see note (a) - 2 689   
(1) NA- Taxable Labour Income  147 108 159 955 107.8 
Replacement Income components in National Accounts  
Social security benefits in cash D.621 Resources II.2 Secondary distrib. of income account + 52 990   
Other social insurance benefits D.622 Resources II.2 Secondary distrib. of income account + 21 733   
Social assistance benefits in cash D.623 Resources II.2 Secondary distrib. of income account 0 4 610   
Non-life insurance claims D.72 Resources II.2 Secondary distrib. of income account + 3 737   
(2) NA-Taxable Replacement Income 78 461 57 433 73.2 
Property Income components in National Accounts  
Gross operating surplus B.2g Resources II.1.2 Allocation of primary income account + 22 020   
Consumption fixed capital on gross operating surplus P51C1   see note (a) - 14 857   
(3) NA-Taxable Property Income 7 163 5 207 72.7 
Financial Assets Income components in National Accounts  
Total interest before allocation of FISIM D.41g Resources II.1.2 Allocation of primary income account + 6 819   
Dividends D.421 Resources II.1.2 Allocation of primary income account + 12 970   
Investment income attrib. to insurance policy holders D.441 Resources II.1.2 Allocation of primary income account + 6 558   
Investment income payable on pension entitlements D.442 Resources II.1.2 Allocation of primary income account + 2 010   
Investm. income attrib. to coll. invest. fund shareholders D.443 Resources II.1.2 Allocation of primary income account + 2 440   
Rents D.45 Resources II.1.2 Allocation of primary income account + 527   
(4) NA-Taxable Income from Financial Assets  31 323 1 009 3.2 
(5) = (1) + (2) = (3) + (4) NA-Income Control 264 054 224 063 84.9 
Net Balance of Primary Income in Sector S14 (B5n) 266 868  84.0 
Net National Income 321 402  69.7 
Pre Tax Personal Factor Income 329 340  68.1 
GDP 392 699  57.1 
Source:  Own calculations based on download of National Accounts from NBB.Stat in October 2015, except for Net National Income and Personal Sector Pre Tax Income, 
downloaded in November 2017.  
(a) split of consumption of fixed capital between mixed income and gross operating surplus obtained from National Bank of Belgium  
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Less ad hoc is the subtraction of the depreciation (or consumption of fixed capital, code P51), both for 
mixed income of unincorporated business and for the gross operating surplus, which is mainly imputed 
and actually received rents.19 In the component ‘Replacement Incomes’ we have not yet corrected the 
national accounts aggregate for elements which are not (and have never been) taxable, as for instance 
child allowances, or study grants.20 They are included in the item under code D.622. Social assistance 
benefits in cash however are separately available in the national accounts (code D.623), and we have 
not included them in the income control total. 
For the income year 2013, this gives us an income reference of €264 054 million. This income reference 
is the in principle taxable income which we would like to find in comprehensive tax files, and the 
distribution of which we would like to follow over time. The two rightmost columns of Table 1 allow 
to compare this income reference with what we observe in the fiscal data (after the operation described 
in section 3.2.2 to calculate back up to gross taxable income). Overall the fiscal data reveal 84.9% of 
income in 2013, and hence we miss a bit less than 15% of what we consider as ‘in principle’ taxable 
income in the tax files. Not surprisingly, this fraction varies considerably across the four income 
components. Compared to the income total in the national accounts, nearly all of the income from 
financial assets is missing in the tax files (96.8%). For income from property and replacement income 
the fraction reported is about 73%. For labour income we have even more income reported in the 
administrative tax files than the corresponding item in the national accounts. Below we will describe 
how the missing income evolves over time. 
Other income control totals are possible than the one illustrated in Table 1. This is illustrated in the 
bottom rows of Table 1. First we could have taken the net balance of primary incomes (code B5n in 
the national accounts) directly from the aggregate in sector S14, instead of calculating it from the 
bottom up. This would give a very similar income control in 2013: € 267bn instead of €264. The other 
three candidates in the three bottom rows of Table 1 differ much more, since in this case income 
aggregates from other institutional sectors are added to the household sector. The broadest net income 
concept is ‘net national income’ calculated here as the sum of the net balances of primary incomes of 
the five sectors. If we would take this as the external income control, then the coverage of the fiscal 
data is reduced to 69.7%. A more reasonable other candidate for an external income control is what is 
called by Alvaredo et al. (2017) ‘Pre tax Personal Factor Income’, amounting to €329bn in 2013. It 
mainly differs from our income control in adding the net balance of primary incomes in sector S11 and 
S12, and hence also considering the retained earnings or undistributed profits as part of the potential 
tax base.21 The coverage of the fiscal data compared to this broader reference income is now further 
reduced to 68.1% in 2013. 
                                                     
19  The split of code P51 into a part attributed to consumption of fixed capital for the mixed income from 
unincorporated business, and a part to be applied on the gross operating surplus, was obtained 
confidentially from the National Accounts team of the National Bank. 
20  Again, it is an ongoing discussion whether child allowances, which have never been taxed, should be 
included in the income reference when the latter aims to measure “in principle taxable income”. Several 
studies have made different choices in this respect, and both options can be defended. 
21  To be precise, following Alvaredo et al. (2017), we calculated Pre Tax Personal Factor Income as the 
sum of net balance of primary incomes (B5n) of sector S14, the B5n’s for sectors S11 and S12, plus the 
net taxes on production (D2-D3) received by the sector S13 (General Government). In some cases one 
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We applied the summation and subtraction of the national accounts aggregates as described in Table 1 
for the years 1985-2014. For 1995 to 2014 we downloaded the Annual Detailed Sector Accounts for 
Sector S14, which are in ESA10 format.22 From the National Accounts team at the Belgian National 
Bank we obtained the historical series of the S14-sector account 1985-1995, which is still in the ESA-
95 standard. To obtain a series for the whole period in the ESA10-standard, we first defined a similar 
income control as the one for the ESA10 standard on the ESA95 data for 1985-1995. To transform this 
income control for the years 1985-1994 from ESA95 terms into ESA10 terms, we used the information 
of the overlapping year 1995. For each income component we applied the growth rate backwards from 
1995 to 1985.23 We show the evolution of the income control, compared to other reference totals in 
figure 6. 
FIGURE 6: RATIO OF THE INCOME CONTROL TO GDP AND OTHER REFERENCE TOTALS 
 
Source:  own calculations based on the National Accounts from NBB.Stat, see Table 7 in appendix 1 
If we consider the Income Control total as the potential tax base, the strongly declining share of the 
income control in % of GDP is striking (the blue line in figure 6). It might suggest that a steadily 
                                                     
can advocate to add only part of the S11and S12 net balance of primary incomes. We have added the full 
amount here. 
22  The national accounts data we use in this paper have been downloaded on October 15 2016 from 
NBB.Stat. 
23  This was done income component by income component. E.g. for 1994, we calculated the income 
component 101994ESAx  where x denotes the income component (e.g. wages and salaries), and the superscript 
the ESA-systems as follows: 
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increasing part of income escapes taxation. However, the other lines in figure 6 add nuance and 
explanation. The grey line shows the income control in % of net national income. The difference 
between net national income and GDP is, besides the rather unimportant net factor incomes from 
abroad, made up of depreciation. The percentage of depreciation increases from 15.7% of GDP in 1995 
to 19.5% in 2014, explaining why an increasing part of gross value added is not found back in the 
taxable base. The second explanation is revealed by comparing the grey line which expresses the 
Income Control with respect to national income, with the green one, which uses the so-called ‘Pre-tax 
Personal Factor Income’ as the denominator. The decline of the ratio of the income control w.r.t. the 
broader concept has now completely been removed. This points to the explanation that an increasing 
part of national income is no longer located in sectors S11, S12 or S14. Indeed, the net balance of 
primary income of the general government sector increased from 3.1% of net national income in 1995 
to 9.3% in 2013. This mainly reflects the fact that during that period interest payments on government 
debt were significantly reduced. Overall the income control we use in this paper makes up about 80% 
of pre-tax personal factor income, and the part we do not include in the income control – the retained 
earnings or undistributed profits – remains stable over time at about 20%.24 Finally the line above 
confirms that the income control we use closely tracks the net balance of primary incomes of sector 
S14 in isolation. 
Figure 7, which shows the relative importance of the four income components in the income control 
(the data can be found in Table 9 in the appendix), shows that also the composition of the income 
control has changed over time. The figure illustrates the unsurprising result that labour and replacement 
income accounts for 85% of the income control, and that the share of replacement income has increased 
(from 24.7% in 1985 to 29.8% in 2014). However, the figure also reveals two other important elements 
in the construction of the income control. The first is the importance of the transition to the new ESA10 
standard in 1995. In 1995 the national account aggregate for income from property dropped from 
€13 945 million to €8 548 million. It was partially offset by an increase in income from financial assets 
(from 24.0bn to 28.3bn). Before we can confidently add this missing income into the analysis of the 
top income shares, we certainly have to better understand what caused this jump.25  
The second surprising element is that, besides the jump in the series in 1995, there is a clear decline in 
the share of income from financial assets and from property in the income control after 1995. In Table 
10 in the appendix we tabulate the yearly growth rates of the four income components. One might 
indeed expect some negative growth rates of income from financial assets and from property in the 
years shortly after the financial crisis. In 2009 income from property declined by 14.4% in the national 
accounts, and income from financial assets by 4.6%. But the below average growth of these two income 
components occurs much more frequently across the period of analysis than only during the financial 
crisis. Whereas labour income growth mostly mimics the growth in the income control, there are large 
deviations for the growth rates of income from property and from financial assets. We leave it for 
                                                     
24  This stable pattern of undistributed earnings is somehow contradicting our prior expectations. We had 
expected that the tendency to shift income from non-incorporated to incorporated activities (also noticed 
by Atkinson, Saez en Piketty 2011, p. 36) would have led to a declining ratio of the income control over 
the concept of pre tax personal factor income which includes undistributed profits. We leave an 
explanation for this surprise finding for further research. 
25  Or, still better, to dispose of a series of national account aggregates which is defined and set-up according 
to the same standard across the whole period of analysis. However, if we extend the analysis further back 
in time, this becomes less and less realistic. 
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further research to fully understand why property income in the national accounts declined by 7% in 
2004, or why income from financial assets fell by 5.6%, by 3.1% and by 1.4% in three consecutive 
years (2002-2004). For now, we keep in mind that the income control (the denominator in income 
shares) deserves as much scrutiny as the income of income groups in the numerator. 
FIGURE 7: SHARES OF FOUR INCOME COMPONENTS IN THE INCOME CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 
(IN %) 
 
Source:  own calculations based on the National Accounts from NBB.Stat, see Table 9 in appendix 1 
3.2.2 Recalculating gross taxable income 
We gratefully acknowledge the service by Statistics Belgium to reconstruct gross taxable income for 
the whole population of taxpayers in the microdata files at their disposal. They added back all 
deductions: for professional expenses (either the lump sum scheme, but also, if applied for by the 
taxpayer, the itemized deductions which had been accepted by the tax officer), and all other deductions 
such as for mortgages of owner occupied housing, gifts, pension savings etc.26 They then delivered us 
tables with gross taxable amounts for four income components (labour income, replacement income, 
property income and income from financial assets), ordered by percentile of either labour and 
replacement income, or of total gross taxable income.27 
                                                     
26  The deductions for professional expenses are, strictly, the costs of running business or earning the 
professional income, and hence they should not be considered part of the individual's taxable income. 
We included them in gross income for two reasons. First, to close the gap with national accounts 
aggregates as much as possible. Second because the use of itemized professional costs is one of the 
channels of tax avoidance.  
27  We also asked Statistics Belgium to remove the income component of capitalised pension funds in the 
second pillar, since this seriously distorted the distributional picture by moving recipients of these one-
shot large income increases into the top of the income distribution. For income from property, filed 
income mainly consists of an non-indexed estimated rental value of the house (‘Cadastral Income’). 
Statistics Belgium indexed this income component with the official price index, listed year by year in 
Appendix 3. 
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On the one hand the service offered by Statistics Belgium allowed us to perform the calculation for the 
whole population of tax filers. On the other hand, since we do not have the micro-data files, our 
analysis—at least for now—is limited to the years for which we could have this reconstruction done, 
i.e. income year 1990 to income year 2013.28 Moreover, additional analysis by re-ordering or 
restructuring the data beyond the delivery in percentiles, is impossible. 
3.2.3 Evolution of the taxable income missing from the income tax files 
figure 8 summarises the evolution of the recorded net and gross taxable income in the administrative 
tax files, as compared to the constructed income control. The blue line with squares shows a pronounced 
increased coverage of the income control by the published net tax income information. Net taxable 
income now makes up about three quarters of the income control (74.1% in 2014), whereas this ratio 
was only 57.3% in 1985. Not surprisingly the increased coverage also appears in the evolution of the 
gross taxable income as a percentage of the income control. The red line with dots shows that, in terms 
of gross taxable income, coverage of the income control total increased from 66.2% in 1990 to 84.9% 
in 2013. This translates into a decline of ‘missing income’, defined as the difference between the 
corresponding totals of gross taxable income in the administrative personal income tax files, and the 
comparable aggregate in the income control, from 33% in 1990 to about 15% in 2013. 
FIGURE 8: RATIO OF NET TAXABLE INCOME IN PUBLISHED NTI-DATA TO INCOME CONTROL AND OF GROSS 
TAXABLE INCOME TO INCOME CONTROL AND GDP 
 
Source:  own calculations based on the National Accounts from NBB.Stat and data obtained from De Standaard and 
Statistics Belgium. See Table 11 in appendix 1 
                                                     
28  In the context of other research projects – mainly the construction and use of personal income tax 
microsimulation models – we do dispose of samples of the tax files for the assessment years 1994, 1997, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. The size of this sample mostly consists of around 
30 000 tax units and contains all income variables. We leave it for future research to investigate how 
serious the sampling variability would affect the estimation of top income shares. 
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We show this steep decline of the fraction of missing income, and its decomposition in the four income 
components, in Figure 9. The extent to which income is missing evidently varies widely across the four 
components, and the overall percentage of missing income of 15% is the result of offsetting 
components. As already mentioned above (in footnote 24) the decline of ‘missing income’ is not 
explained by an increasing share of retained earnings or undistributed profits. It mostly has to do with 
an increasing enrolment of low incomes, due to the introduction of a tax credit for replacement incomes. 
In Figure 9, this shows up as a significant decrease in missing replacement income (from 45% of this 
income control component in 1990 to 26.8% in 2013). Nearly no income from financial assets is visible 
in the fiscal data (missing income of 97%), mainly due to the separate taxation through the liberating 
withholding tax. The decline of missing income from property from 63.5% in 1990 to 27% in 2013 
however, is mainly explained by the decline of the reference total for property income in the national 
accounts. Surprisingly, since 1994, we consistently find more gross labour income in the tax files, than 
the corresponding national accounts aggregate in the constructed income control. These two last 
observations clearly need further research in the future, either in scrutinising the national accounts’ 
definitions better, or in refining the suitable income control. 
FIGURE 9: EVOLUTION OF MISSING INCOME IN % OF INCOME CONTROL OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS FOR GTI 
AND THE FOUR COMPONENTS 
 
Source:  own calculations based on the National Accounts from NBB.Stat, see Table 11 in appendix 1. 
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4. TOP 10% AND TOP 1% SHARE OF GROSS INCOME IN THE WID-FRAMEWORK 
In this section we present estimates of the evolution of the income share of the top 10% and the top 1%, 
taking into account the correction from net taxable income to gross taxable income and the addition of 
non-filers at the bottom (Section 4.1), and the allocation of missing income (Section 4.2). In Section 4.3 
we compare this evolution with comparable data in the WID database. 
4.1 TOP INCOME SHARES IN THE CORRECTED FISCAL DATA 
figure 10 and Figure 11 compare the evolution of the income share for the top decile and the top 
percentile respectively, emerging from the published tables (i.e. based on net taxable income and often 
used in public debates) with the one based on gross taxable income and correcting for variation in filing 
population.  
FIGURE 10: COMPARISON OF SHARE OF THE TOP DECILE (IN %) IN PUBLISHED NET TAXABLE INCOME (NTI) 
AND AFTER RECONSTRUCTING GROSS TAXABLE INCOME (GTI) AND CONTROLLING FOR 
POPULATION 
 
Source:  own calculations based on data obtained from Statistics Belgium. 
Note: The blue series of gross taxable income (GTI) differs from the red series of net taxable income (NTI), by both 
adding the deductions, and also inserting zeroes at the bottom to comply with the population control. The grey 
line shows the effect of only adding additional zero incomes at the bottom. Missing income has not yet been 
added. 
The red line displays the share when calculated on the published net taxable income without any 
correction. The blue line shows the income share after the two corrections have been implemented. The 
results are striking. If we recalculate quantile values where top decile and top percentile start by 
inserting zeroes at the bottom, and if we add deductions (the difference between net taxable income 
and gross taxable income) to come closer to the income control, the result of increasing income shares 
at the top of the distribution vanishes. The result is most outspoken for the top percentile (Figure 11), 
where the income share declines from a maximum of 9.8% in 2001 to 8.3% in 2013. Note that the level 
itself of the top percentile income share is much higher than the corresponding level measured on the 
basis of net taxable income. The same holds for the evolution of the income share of the top decile in 
figure 10: the income share is significantly higher than the one measured on the net taxable income 
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concept (35.2% compared to 31.4% in 2013). But, contrary to what is observed on the basis of the net 
taxable income data, since 1990 the top decile income share has not been increasing. In actual fact, it 
fell from a maximum of 37.5% in 1994 to 35.2% in 2013. 
FIGURE 11: COMPARISON OF SHARE OF THE TOP PERCENTILE (IN %) IN PUBLISHED NET TAXABLE INCOME 
(NTI) AND AFTER RECONSTRUCTING GROSS TAXABLE INCOME (GTI) AND CONTROLLING FOR 
POPULATION 
 
Source: own calculations based on data obtained from Statistics Belgium.  
Note: The blue series of gross taxable income (GTI) differs from the red series of net taxable income (NTI), by both 
adding the deductions, and also inserting zeroes at the bottom to comply with the population control. The grey 
line shows the effect of only adding additional zero incomes at the bottom. Missing income has not yet been 
added 
To investigate whether this striking result is mainly due to the addition of deductions, or to the 
redefinition of the population subgroups which form the top decile and the top percentile after we have 
added the bottom of the distribution, we isolated the effect of the insertion of the zero incomes on the 
basis of an estimated Pareto distribution. In Appendix 3 we explain how we estimated the Pareto-
parameter on the basis of the tabulated information of net taxable income for the deciles and the 
percentiles in the top decile. We then used this Pareto-distribution in the top to infer how the quantile 
values and hence also the income shares for D10 and P100 changed after insertion of zeroes at the 
bottom to comply with the population control. The result is the grey line with diamonds in figure 10 
and Figure 11. The result shows that for both the top decile and the top percentile, both corrections to 
the published tables are important. For the top decile the increase in the share, observed in the published 
tables, is removed completely when the correction needed to comply with the population control is 
added. For the top percentile there is still a small increase, but much less outspoken. The correction 
induced by adding back the income tax deductions are much more outspoken in the top percentile than 
in the top decile. 
4.2 ADJUSTING TO THE INCOME CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 
The conclusion of the previous subsection is of course preliminary, since we have not yet adjusted the 
shares of gross fiscal income to make up for the missing income in the income control. Above, we have 
identified the size of the missing income. The question remains however as to how to allocate this 
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missing income across the distribution. Without additional information there are three obvious 
possibilities.  
First we can calculate a lower bound on the income share of a given income group by adding all missing 
income to the other income groups. In practice this means that we use filed gross taxable income for 
the top decile or percentile in the numerator, and put the income control in the denominator. The point 
is not whether this assumption is realistic. It obviously is not, and we definitely underestimate the true 
income share of the top income groups (otherwise it would not be a lower bound). But the lower bound 
is calculated consistently over the whole time period. The mirror image of the lower bound, is the upper 
bound on the income share by adding all missing income to the top decile or percentile. The same 
considerations as the ones in the previous paragraphs apply here. Finally, we could assume that missing 
income is distributed across the income distribution in proportion to the observed income. In that case, 
the observed income shares would remain unaffected, and are the ones that we have already described 
in figure 10 and Figure 11. 
The result of these three benchmark cases of allocating the missing income are tabulated in Appendix 2 
Table 12 and Figure 14 for the top decile and Table 13 and Figure 15 for the top percentile). The results 
show – unsurprisingly – that the assumption about how to allocate the missing income is absolutely 
crucial to state whether the income shares of the top income groups have increased or decreased. It is 
indeed possible to produce an increasing share for both the top decile and the top percentile, but only 
when we allocate the missing income disproportionately outside these income groups, which is quite 
an unrealistic assumption. Moreover, the other side of the coin is that this assumption leads to a low 
level of the top decile income share as compared to other countries (see below, Figure 12 in 
Section 4.3).29 
4.3 COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 
In Figure 12 we compare the newly constructed income shares for the top decile with the shares of 
some other countries available in the WID database: neighbouring countries France, the Netherlands, 
Germany and the UK, and also the United States. We find that the lower bound of the income share of 
the top decile is much lower than in other countries, but that it is rising. If we allocate the missing 
income proportionately – our preferred series for the moment – , we conclude that in 1990 the income 
share of the top decile was higher than in France and the Netherlands, but that, contrary to the evolution 
in the UK, US, Germany, and to a lesser extent France and the Netherlands, the income share has not 
increased. 
The same holds mutatis mutandis for the evolution of the top percentile, as displayed in Figure 13. As 
it is increasingly unrealistic to assume that all missing income has to be allocated to the top percentile, 
we have not displayed the upper bound in this case. But the conclusion from the analysis is that the 
                                                     
29  In appendix 2 we also show how we can further refine the assumptions about the allocation of the missing 
income, by e.g. decomposing the missing income into its four income components, and differentiating 
the allocation according to assumed income shares of the different income components for the top decile 
and the top percentile. The results are in the column with header ‘adjusted by income component’ in 
Table 12 and Table 13 in appendix 2. But besides the influence on the level of the share, this more 
elaborate allocation confirms the decline of the top decile income share. For the top percentile even the 
lower bound is not increasing, except at the very beginning of the period. 
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pronounced increase in the income share for the top one percent in many countries, can—at least in this 
preliminary analysis—not easily be replicated for Belgium; the income share of the top one percent is 
lower than in many other countries (except for the Netherlands), and anyhow, it is not increasing. 
FIGURE 12: COMPARISON OF SHARE OF TOP DECILE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN WID-DATABASE 
 
Source:  Table 14 in Appendix 1 
FIGURE 13: COMPARISON OF SHARE OF TOP PERCENTILE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN WID-DATABASE 
 
Source:  Table 15 in Appendix 1 
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Finally we can also summarize the findings by comparing the Pareto-parameter, estimated on the gross 
taxable income data, both through time, and cross country. We estimated the Pareto parameter on the 
percentile information for the gross taxable income concept provided by Statistics Belgium, as 
explained in Appendix 3. In Table 2 we provide both the estimated Pareto-parameter ( ) as the 
transformation of it (  ) which can act as an inequality measure.30  
TABLE 2 PARETO’S   FOR BELGIUM 1990-2013 AND COMPARISON WITH SELECTED OTHER COUNTRIES BASED 
ON THE TRANSFORMED PARAMETER    
Year     1
    
  Belgium  Belgium  France  Netherlands  Germany  UK  US 
1990  2.50  1.67           
1991  2.56  1.64           
1992  2.63  1.61           
1993  2.60  1.63           
1994  2.44  1.70           
1995  2.47  1.68           
1996  2.36  1.73           
1997  2.43  1.70           
1998  2.44  1.70      2.49     
1999  2.40  1.72    1.43       
2000  2.40  1.71           
2001  2.35  1.74           
2002  2.49  1.67           
2003  2.54  1.65           
2004  2.47  1.68           
2005  2.53  1.66  1.83      2.28  2.82 
2006  2.52  1.66           
2007  2.52  1.66           
2008  2.58  1.63           
2009  2.67  1.60           
2010  2.66  1.60           
2011  2.68  1.59           
2012  2.68  1.60           
2013  2.70  1.59           
Source:.  own calculations for Belgium as explained in Appendix 3. For the other countries Atkinson, Piketty and 
Saez (2011), Table 6 on p. 45.  
Note:  See footnote 30 for the interpretation of   and     
                                                     
30  The Pareto-parameter   can be interpreted as the elasticity of the fraction of people above a given 
income level w.r.t. that income level. E.g. if 1.5  then an increase of the income level by 10%, reduces 
the fraction of people above that income level with 15%. The lower  , the slower the fraction declines 
as we move up the income scale. It is easy to show that the transformation 1     gives an estimate 
of the ratio of average income above a given income level over that income level (see equation (16) in 
Appendix 3). E.g. if 1.5  , then 3.0  , and – if the Pareto-distribution is the appropriate assumption, 
for any chosen income level, the average income above that income level is three times the chosen income 
level. 
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The results show that inequality in the top part of the distribution is lower in the Belgian fiscal data than 
in the other countries. For a common year 2005, the ratio of average income above a given – high –  
income level and the that threshold income level is 2.82 in the US and only 1.60 in Belgium. Moreover 
in the Belgian fiscal data this ratio is declining through time. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have made a first attempt to use filed personal income tax data to estimate income 
shares for the top 1% and top 10% of the income distribution, in line with the by now well established 
practice of the WID network. The cumulative effect of the dependency of net taxable income on 
changing tax legislation, and of changes in administrative practices of enrolment, renders the published 
tables unsuited for an assessment of the evolution of top income shares. We tried to comply with 
international standards by correcting the published income data from 1990 to 2013 to match a reference 
total for aggregate income and a reference total for the population. This correction consisted of three 
steps: calculating back from net taxable income to gross taxable income, redefining the borders of the 
top income groups by accounting for the large and changing amount of non-filers at the bottom, and 
assessing the magnitude of personal income which does not appear in personal income tax files due to 
tax legislation, tax evasion or tax fraud. 
The effect of the first two corrections is substantial and unequivocal. The increasing income share for 
the top decile and percentile disappears and is transformed into a more or less stable income share. This 
is an important result when related to the finding we described in the introduction: on the basis of 
disposable income surveys (after taxes and transfers), there is no outspoken increase in inequality in 
recent decades. This might be stretched too easily into the conclusion that this points towards an 
increasing role of redistributive activities of the tax and transfer system, implicitly assuming that this is 
needed to counter increased inequality of before-tax income. If our result on the top income share is a 
first indication that also inequality in income before taxes has not significantly increased, the result of 
stable inequality in the distribution of disposable incomes comes much less as a surprise, and can be 
obtained without enhancing redistributive activities. 
The effect of the non-observed missing income is more difficult to assess, and the results have to be 
interpreted with caution. First, there is the choice of how to allocate the missing income. If we apply a 
conservative – but obviously unrealistic –  assumption, that all missing (or unobserved) income is 
attributed to the income groups outside the ‘top’, we indeed find mildly increasing top income shares. 
These increasing shares disappear however once we choose less unrealistic assumptions. Second, and 
more importantly, the size of the missing income strongly declines over the time-period considered. 
This is partly due to better enrolment and filing, but this effect plays mainly for replacement incomes 
and enrolment of other low incomes. Contrary to our prior expectations, the decline in missing income 
is probably not due to an outspoken shift of the allocation of net valued added from the non-
incorporated to the incorporated sector (from S14 to S11 and S12). If there has been a change in the 
relative magnitude of the sectors in national income, it is not the increasing share of e.g. the retained 
earnings – i.e. the net primary balance of S11 and S12 – which catch the eye. The mild decrease in the 
income of the household sector is the other side of the increasing net primary balance of general 
government in S13, due to decreasing interest payments on government debt. However, this does not 
diminish our worry that, based on national accounts information on which we construct our income 
control, the role of income from property and of income from financial assets within sector S14 has 
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substantially diminished through time. This is surprising to us, and reinforces the arguments to develop 
distributional analysis which fits into and is consistent with a macro-economic national accounting 
framework (as advocated in the DINA research agenda). 
This first, but also preliminary, exercise has to—and hopefully will—be extended in several directions. 
The first one is the most obvious. Most studies reported in Atkinson and Piketty (2007 and 2010) stretch 
the analysis several decades into the past, preferably back to the First World War, and some even into 
the nineteenth century. Also in Belgium we have published tables of personal income taxes and related 
net taxable income back to the 1920’s. Up until 1977, records are even available in digital and 
comparable form as the tables currently published on the website of Statistics Belgium. This should 
make the extension up to 1977 quite straightforward. Extension to 1963 – the year in which personal 
income taxes have been introduced in their current form – should be not that difficult neither. Second, 
we have already begun to explore possibilities to impute capital incomes based on microdata available 
in the Household Finance and Consumption Surveys of the ECB. We will compare whether this 
imputation can put the allocation of missing income from financial assets on a firmer footing than the 
benchmarks used in this paper. Third, we plan to fill in other missing parts of the distribution, such as 
missing replacement or subsistence incomes at the bottom, and the underestimation of property income, 
which is spread more uniformly across the distribution. Finally, if the preliminary results that Belgium 
does not follow the trend of increasing inequality in before tax income are corroborated in the further 
research described above, we need to understand why this is the case. By focussing on pre-tax incomes, 
we – at least partly – eliminate the effect of the redistributive tax and transfer system. This means that 
an explanation will probably lie in the working of labour and capital markets themselves. 
This list of additional work to be done is sufficient testimony to the preliminary character of the results. 
Yet, we are convinced that this first application of the WID framework to Belgian data was useful. It 
allows us to determine more precisely which further data and analysis are needed, and has identified, 
in a proper scientific way, at least some known unknowns. 
6. REFERENCES 
Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A.B., Piketty T., and Saez E. (2013), The top 1 percent in international and 
historical perspective, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27 (3), 3-20. 
Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A. B., Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E. and Zucman, G. (2017), Distributional 
National Accounts (DINA) Guidelines: Concepts and Methods used in WID.world, WID.world 
Working Paper Series N° 2016/1, Paris (we used the version of june 2017). 
Atkinson, A. B. (2007), Measuring Top Incomes: Methodological Issues, Chapter 2 in Atkinson, A.B. 
and Piketty, T., Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast Between European and 
English-Speaking Countries, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T. (2007), Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T. (2010), Top Incomes. A Global Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Atkinson, A. B, Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2011), Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 49 (1), 3–71. 
DECOSTER, DEDOBBELEER & MAES TOP INCOME SHARES BELGIUM 1990-2013 DECEMBER 2017 29 
Deleeck, H, (1977), Ongelijkheden in de welvaartsstaat, Antwerpen, De Nederlandse boekhandel. 
Förster, M., Llena-Nozal A. and Nafilyan V. (2014), Trends in Top Incomes and their Taxation in 
OECD Countries, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 159, OECD 
Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz43jhlz87f-en 
Horemans, J., Pintelon, O., en Vandenbroucke, P. (2011), Inkomens en inkomensverdeling op basis van 
Belgische enquêtegegevens: 1985-2007, CSB Berichten, Centrum voor Sociaal Beleid Herman 
Deleeck, Antwerpen. 
Kuznets, S. (1953), Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass. 
Kuznets, S. (1955), Economic growth and income inequality. American Economic Review 45 (1), 1-
28. 
Nolan, B., Salverda, W., Checchi, D., Marx, I., McKnight, A., Tóth, I.G. and van de Werfhorst, H.G. 
(2014), Changing Inequalities and Societal Impacts in Rich Countries. Thirty Countries' 
Experiences, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
OECD (2008), Growing Unequal? Income distribution and poverty in OECD countries, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
OECD (2011), Divided we stand Why inequality keeps rising, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
OECD (2012), Income distribution data review – Belgium, Paris, downloaded from 
www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm . 
OECD (2015), In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Piketty, T. (2001), Les hauts revenus en France au 20ième siècle, Grasset, Paris. 
Piketty, T. (2003), Income inequality in France, 1901–1998, Journal of Political Economy, 111 (5), 
1004-1042. 
Roine, J. and Waldenström, D. (2015), Long run trends in the distribution of income and wealth, 
Chapter 7 in Atkinson, A.B. and Bourguignon, F., Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol. 2A, 
p.469-592. 
Valenduc, C. (2017), Distribution et redistribution des revenus: évolution des inégalités en Belgique, 
Courrier hebdomadaire CRiSP n° 2346-2347, Brussel. 
Van Rie, T. and Marx, I. (2014), Belgium: when growing background inequalities meet resilient 
institutions, Chapter 6 in: Nolan, B., Salverda, W., Checchi, D., Marx, I., McKnight, A., Tóth, 
I.G. and van de Werfhorst, H.G., Changing Inequalities and Societal Impacts in Rich Countries. 
Thirty Countries' Experiences, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
  
DECOSTER, DEDOBBELEER & MAES TOP INCOME SHARES BELGIUM 1990-2013 DECEMBER 2017 30 
APPENDIX 1: DETAILED TABLES 
TABLE 3: SHARE OF DECILES BASED ON PUBLISHED DATA OF NET TAXABLE INCOME (IN %) 
Year  D1  D2  D3  D4  D5  D6  D7  D8  D9  D10 
1973  1.43  2.87  4.40  5.76  6.93  8.27  9.79  11.91  15.58  33.06 
1974  1.44  2.97  4.47  5.90  7.11  8.44  10.00  12.11  15.65  31.90 
1975  1.45  3.04  4.51  6.00  7.24  8.56  10.14  12.25  15.70  31.10 
1976  1.06  2.76  4.60  6.23  7.59  9.00  10.43  12.44  15.73  30.16 
1977  1.19  3.04  4.80  6.32  7.66  8.98  10.38  12.37  15.61  29.64 
1978  1.24  3.06  4.76  6.30  7.67  8.99  10.41  12.44  15.68  29.46 
1979  1.29  3.03  4.61  6.18  7.55  9.03  10.82  12.94  15.71  28.84 
1980  1.23  2.97  4.58  6.15  7.53  8.99  10.80  13.04  15.95  28.77 
1981  1.25  3.06  4.59  6.15  7.54  9.04  10.88  13.14  16.15  28.20 
1982  1.96  4.53  5.64  6.63  7.70  8.98  10.56  12.53  15.42  26.03 
1983  1.90  4.54  5.72  6.70  7.77  9.04  10.61  12.58  15.43  25.73 
1984  1.75  4.40  5.75  6.77  7.85  9.12  10.71  12.71  15.57  25.36 
1985  1.68  4.30  5.70  6.71  7.78  9.05  10.66  12.70  15.58  25.83 
1986  1.63  4.27  5.68  6.70  7.75  9.01  10.61  12.65  15.57  26.13 
1987  1.53  4.07  5.53  6.59  7.66  8.92  10.55  12.66  15.70  26.79 
1988  1.49  4.12  5.54  6.57  7.64  8.90  10.52  12.62  15.64  26.95 
1989  1.49  4.16  5.51  6.51  7.56  8.81  10.43  12.53  15.61  27.40 
1990  1.47  4.16  5.48  6.50  7.57  8.81  10.42  12.55  15.69  27.34 
1991  1.49  4.16  5.44  6.46  7.54  8.79  10.41  12.55  15.72  27.43 
1992  1.98  4.27  5.38  6.38  7.45  8.70  10.33  12.50  15.70  27.31 
1993  1.97  4.23  5.35  6.36  7.44  8.69  10.32  12.52  15.79  27.32 
1994  1.88  4.10  5.26  6.31  7.42  8.68  10.32  12.56  15.91  27.55 
1995  1.85  4.14  5.27  6.29  7.37  8.63  10.26  12.53  15.99  27.68 
1996  1.81  4.09  5.22  6.24  7.31  8.55  10.15  12.44  15.94  28.25 
1997  1.77  4.04  5.17  6.19  7.28  8.53  10.13  12.46  16.07  28.36 
1998  1.74  3.99  5.12  6.15  7.25  8.48  10.08  12.43  16.08  28.68 
1999  1.68  3.92  5.02  6.06  7.18  8.42  10.00  12.37  16.10  29.26 
2000  1.67  4.00  5.10  6.10  7.18  8.38  9.94  12.33  16.09  29.21 
2001  1.55  3.87  4.93  5.97  7.09  8.31  9.87  12.27  16.11  30.03 
2002  1.35  3.74  4.82  5.88  7.06  8.35  9.93  12.36  16.34  30.18 
2003  1.10  3.61  4.74  5.81  7.01  8.35  9.95  12.40  16.50  30.54 
2004  0.72  3.28  4.54  5.58  6.86  8.32  10.00  12.50  16.78  31.43 
2005  0.68  3.25  4.52  5.56  6.85  8.29  9.98  12.48  16.80  31.58 
2006  0.61  3.19  4.50  5.55  6.85  8.28  9.95  12.46  16.81  31.81 
2007  0.57  3.15  4.48  5.54  6.82  8.23  9.90  12.40  16.77  32.14 
2008  0.54  3.16  4.56  5.60  6.86  8.26  9.92  12.41  16.75  31.95 
2009  0.52  3.16  4.60  5.64  6.89  8.28  9.92  12.40  16.71  31.87 
2010  0.51  3.15  4.63  5.66  6.90  8.30  9.96  12.44  16.75  31.70 
2011  0.59  3.29  4.66  5.69  6.90  8.29  9.95  12.41  16.68  31.55 
2012  0.71  3.42  4.68  5.69  6.88  8.24  9.89  12.35  16.59  31.54 
2013  0.69  3.39  4.69  5.71  6.91  8.27  9.93  12.40  16.63  31.38 
2014  0.68  3.33  4.59  5.61  6.83  8.23  9.91  12.43  16.78  31.60 
Source: own calculations based on data from Statistics Belgium and data obtained from De Standaard.   
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TABLE 4: SHARE OF TOP TEN PERCENTILES IN PUBLISHED NET TAXABLE INCOME (IN %) 
Year  P91  P92  P93  P94  P95  P96  P97  P98  P99  P100 
1973                     
1974                     
1975                     
1976                     
1977  1.86  1.94  2.03  2.14  2.28  2.45  2.68  3.04  3.71  7.52 
1978  1.86  1.94  2.04  2.15  2.28  2.45  2.68  3.04  3.70  7.33 
1979  1.84  1.91  2.00  2.11  2.24  2.41  2.63  2.97  3.61  7.11 
1980  1.85  1.93  2.02  2.12  2.25  2.42  2.64  2.98  3.60  6.97 
1981  1.86  1.93  2.02  2.12  2.25  2.41  2.62  2.94  3.53  6.51 
1982  1.79  1.86  1.94  2.03  2.13  2.27  2.46  2.72  3.22  5.62 
1983  1.78  1.85  1.92  2.01  2.12  2.25  2.43  2.69  3.17  5.51 
1984  1.80  1.86  1.94  2.02  2.13  2.26  2.43  2.68  3.12  5.13 
1985  1.80  1.87  1.95  2.04  2.14  2.28  2.45  2.71  3.17  5.42 
1986  1.81  1.88  1.95  2.05  2.15  2.29  2.47  2.73  3.21  5.59 
1987  1.83  1.90  1.98  2.08  2.19  2.33  2.52  2.79  3.28  5.89 
1988  1.82  1.90  1.98  2.07  2.18  2.33  2.51  2.78  3.29  6.09 
1989  1.83  1.90  1.98  2.08  2.20  2.34  2.53  2.81  3.33  6.40 
1990  1.84  1.91  1.99  2.09  2.21  2.35  2.54  2.82  3.34  6.26 
1991  1.84  1.92  2.00  2.09  2.21  2.35  2.53  2.81  3.32  6.34 
1992  1.84  1.91  1.99  2.09  2.20  2.34  2.52  2.79  3.29  6.34 
1993  1.86  1.93  2.01  2.11  2.22  2.36  2.55  2.82  3.31  6.14 
1994  1.87  1.95  2.03  2.13  2.24  2.38  2.56  2.83  3.32  6.23 
1995  1.89  1.96  2.05  2.15  2.26  2.40  2.59  2.86  3.35  6.17 
1996  1.89  1.96  2.05  2.15  2.27  2.41  2.60  2.87  3.37  6.69 
1997  1.91  1.99  2.07  2.17  2.29  2.44  2.63  2.91  3.43  6.52 
1998  1.91  1.99  2.08  2.18  2.31  2.45  2.65  2.93  3.46  6.71 
1999  1.92  2.00  2.09  2.20  2.32  2.47  2.67  2.97  3.52  7.09 
2000  1.92  2.00  2.10  2.20  2.33  2.48  2.68  2.98  3.53  6.99 
2001  1.93  2.01  2.11  2.21  2.34  2.50  2.71  3.02  3.59  7.60 
2002  1.97  2.05  2.15  2.26  2.39  2.56  2.77  3.09  3.67  7.27 
2003  2.00  2.08  2.18  2.30  2.43  2.60  2.82  3.14  3.73  7.24 
2004  2.04  2.13  2.23  2.35  2.49  2.67  2.89  3.23  3.84  7.58 
2005  2.05  2.14  2.25  2.37  2.51  2.69  2.92  3.25  3.86  7.55 
2006  2.05  2.15  2.25  2.37  2.52  2.70  2.93  3.27  3.90  7.67 
2007  2.05  2.15  2.26  2.38  2.53  2.71  2.95  3.31  3.97  7.83 
2008  2.05  2.14  2.25  2.38  2.53  2.71  2.95  3.30  3.94  7.71 
2009  2.04  2.14  2.25  2.37  2.52  2.70  2.94  3.29  3.93  7.67 
2010  2.05  2.14  2.25  2.38  2.52  2.71  2.94  3.29  3.91  7.51 
2011  2.04  2.13  2.24  2.36  2.51  2.69  2.93  3.27  3.89  7.50 
2012  2.03  2.12  2.23  2.35  2.50  2.68  2.92  3.27  3.90  7.54 
2013  2.03  2.12  2.23  2.35  2.50  2.68  2.91  3.25  3.87  7.43 
2014  2.05  2.14  2.25  2.37  2.51  2.69  2.93  3.27  3.89  7.50 
Source: own calculations based on data from Statistics Belgium. 
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TABLE 5: POPULATION OF FISCAL HOUSEHOLDS 
Year 
# of   # of f.f.  # of f.f.  # individ.  # ind. marr.  reference  (1)  
in % of  
(6) 
fiscal forms  with NTI>0  with NTI=0  older 15  or cohab.  fiscal pop. 
(1)  (2)  (3)=(1)‐(2)  (4)  (5)  (6)=(4)‐(5) 
1973               
1974               
1975               
1976               
1977    3 428 738           
1978    3 488 147           
1979    3 579 269           
1980    3 641 035           
1981    3 709 283           
1982    3 766 919           
1983    3 801 161           
1984    3 859 523           
1985    3 918 638           
1986    3 972 177           
1987    4 092 165           
1988    4 106 092           
1989    4 095 355           
1990  4 126 549  4 118 094  8 455  8 146 622  2 510 825  5 635 797  73.2 
1991  4 116 552  4 107 291  9 261  8 175 704  2 509 170  5 666 534  72.6 
1992  4 098 230  4 087 829  10 401  8 200 735  2 509 833  5 690 902  72.0 
1993  4 109 982  4 097 444  12 538  8 238 912  2 508 992  5 729 920  71.7 
1994  4 092 745  4 079 895  12 850  8 269 827  2 502 778  5 767 049  71.0 
1995  4 299 155  4 285 858  13 297  8 303 744  2 495 799  5 807 945  74.0 
1996  4 390 443  4 376 513  13 930  8 326 037  2 471 560  5 854 477  75.0 
1997  4 468 343  4 454 892  13 451  8 359 014  2 456 667  5 902 347  75.7 
1998  4 560 718  4 546 244  14 474  8 384 961  2 439 500  5 945 461  76.7 
1999  4 676 952  4 659 358  17 594  8 408 502  2 418 631  5 989 871  78.1 
2000  4 768 220  4 747 506  20 714  8 434 300  2 399 103  6 035 197  79.0 
2001  4 933 209  4 905 623  27 586  8 458 324  2 379 650  6 078 674  81.2 
2002  5 223 902  5 142 011  81 891  8 504 480  2 358 934  6 145 546  85.0 
2003  5 544 667  5 369 652  175 015  8 553 145  2 336 069  6 217 076  89.2 
2004  6 218 664  5 744 682  473 982  8 598 982  2 314 167  6 284 815  98.9 
2005  6 360 935  5 858 996  501 939  8 650 994  2 294 968  6 356 026  100.1 
2006  6 515 804  5 991 864  523 940  8 715 280  2 279 158  6 436 122  101.2 
2007  6 609 770  6 077 874  531 896  8 786 805  2 266 254  6 520 551  101.4 
2008  6 710 716  6 143 173  567 543  8 866 411  2 255 588  6 610 823  101.5 
2009  6 771 747  6 159 576  612 171  8 938 204  2 238 798  6 699 406  101.1 
2010  6 877 802  6 213 128  664 674  9 007 671  2 221 974  6 785 697  101.4 
2011  6 797 689  6 221 984  575 705  9 133 341  2 211 633  6 921 708  98.2 
2012  6 699 350  6 157 995  541 355  9 208 910  2 192 712  7 016 198  95.5 
2013  6 749 995  6 193 498  556 497         
2014  6 831 327  6 261 830  569 497         
Source: own calculations based on demographic data from EUROSTAT and data obtained from Statistics Belgium. 
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TABLE 6: GROWTH OF NEXT TAXABLE INCOME (NTI) BASED ON PUBLISHED DATA FOR TOTAL NTI, D1, D10 AND 
P100 AND COMPARISON WITH NATIONAL ACCOUNTS (1974 – 2014) - IN % 
Year 
Published Net Taxable Income (NTI)  National Accounts (NA) 
NTI  D1  D10  P100  GDP  B.5n (S14)  NNI 
Pre Tax 
Pers.Sector Inc 
Income 
Control 
1974  22.3  23.3  18.0    16.6         
1975  18.2  18.9  15.2    11.1         
1976  16.1  ‐15.1  12.6    13.7         
1977  10.2  24.3  8.3    8.2         
1978  8.1  12.5  7.4  5.3  7.0         
1979  10.1  13.9  7.8  6.8  7.5         
1980  9.2  4.3  8.9  7.0  8.2         
1981  7.6  9.6  5.5  0.5  4.8         
1982  15.4  80.7  6.5  ‐0.5  8.2         
1983  2.3  ‐0.7  1.1  0.3  5.9         
1984  2.6  ‐5.3  1.2  ‐4.4  8.0         
1985  4.6  0.4  6.5  10.4  6.4         
1986  4.2  0.7  5.4  7.6  4.7  5.2      4.3 
1987  2.7  ‐3.7  5.3  8.2  4.0  2.1      1.6 
1988  2.9  0.2  3.5  6.5  7.0  3.7      3.7 
1989  7.2  7.7  8.9  12.6  8.4  6.2      5.9 
1990  5.7  4.3  5.5  3.5  6.0  8.6      8.8 
1991  5.9  6.9  6.2  7.3  4.8  6.4      6.2 
1992  8.0  43.7  7.5  7.8  5.0  5.1      5.4 
1993  3.2  2.8  3.2  0.0  3.0  4.5      4.7 
1994  2.3  ‐2.2  3.1  3.8  5.4  4.0      3.7 
1995  5.2  3.2  5.7  4.2  3.7  2.7      ‐0.6 
1996  3.5  1.5  5.7  12.2  2.0  0.5  1.7  1.1  1.0 
1997  3.4  0.9  3.8  0.7  4.6  3.1  4.7  4.0  2.8 
1998  4.0  2.1  5.2  7.1  3.8  3.9  3.5  3.2  3.5 
1999  4.1  0.4  6.2  10.0  4.2  3.0  3.7  3.3  3.4 
2000  3.9  3.4  3.8  2.5  5.7  5.5  5.9  5.5  5.2 
2001  6.8  ‐0.5  9.8  16.1  2.9  4.7  1.7  1.4  4.8 
2002  4.5  ‐9.3  5.1  0.1  3.5  1.1  3.3  2.7  1.4 
2003  3.7  ‐15.5  4.9  3.2  2.8  0.9  2.4  2.0  1.3 
2004  4.9  ‐31.2  7.9  9.9  5.7  2.3  5.3  5.0  2.0 
2005  3.9  ‐1.7  4.4  3.4  4.3  3.3  3.8  3.2  3.6 
2006  4.5  ‐5.7  5.2  6.1  4.9  4.7  4.6  4.3  4.4 
2007  4.4  ‐3.8  5.5  6.7  5.5  5.3  5.4  5.3  4.6 
2008  5.2  ‐0.4  4.6  3.5  2.7  5.6  3.1  2.9  5.9 
2009  2.6  ‐0.2  2.3  2.1  ‐1.5  ‐0.8  ‐4.9  ‐4.8  0.2 
2010  1.4  ‐0.6  0.9  ‐0.7  4.7  1.7  8.8  8.2  1.4 
2011  4.0  19.9  3.6  3.9  3.8  2.7  1.0  0.8  2.3 
2012  4.0  25.2  4.0  4.7  2.2  2.4  3.7  3.6  3.0 
2013  2.7  0.3  2.2  1.2  1.4  1.2  0.2  ‐0.2  1.0 
2014  4.5  1.8  5.2  5.4  2.0  0.8      1.4 
Source:   own calculations on data Statistics Belgium and data from NA (AMECO and NBB.Stat).  
Note:   B5.n_S14 stands for net balance of primary incomes in sector S14; NNI stands for Net National 
Income, the sum of B5n’s for all sectors. Pre Tax Personal Sector Income is B5n of sectors S14, S11 
and S12, and net production taxes. 
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TABLE 7: SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF NATIONAL INCOME AND RELATION WITH THE INCOME CONTROL (IN %) 
Year 
Income 
control as 
% of GDP 
NNI as % of 
GDP 
Sectoral components of NNI  Income Control as % of 
S11+S12  S13  S14  S15  NNI 
Pre Tax 
Pers.Sect
or Inc 
1985  81.3               
1986  81.0               
1987  79.1               
1988  76.7               
1989  74.9               
1990  76.9               
1991  78.0               
1992  78.3               
1993  79.6               
1994  78.3               
1995  75.1  86.5  8.8  3.1  88.1  0.019  86.8  79.7 
1996  74.3  86.2  8.8  4.1  87.1  0.017  86.2  79.6 
1997  73.0  86.3  9.0  5.3  85.7  0.015  84.7  78.7 
1998  72.8  86.1  8.5  5.5  86.0  0.014  84.6  78.9 
1999  72.3  85.7  8.1  6.4  85.5  0.018  84.4  79.0 
2000  71.9  85.8  8.1  6.7  85.2  0.017  83.8  78.8 
2001  73.2  84.8  5.6  6.6  87.7  0.017  86.3  81.3 
2002  71.8  84.6  6.7  7.3  85.9  0.012  84.8  80.4 
2003  70.7  84.3  7.7  7.6  84.7  0.013  83.9  79.8 
2004  68.3  84.0  9.4  8.3  82.3  0.013  81.3  77.5 
2005  67.8  83.6  9.6  8.5  81.9  0.016  81.1  77.8 
2006  67.5  83.4  9.5  8.6  82.0  0.016  81.0  77.9 
2007  66.9  83.3  9.8  8.3  81.9  0.018  80.3  77.4 
2008  68.9  83.6  8.1  8.0  83.9  0.017  82.4  79.7 
2009  70.2  80.7  4.4  8.1  87.5  0.033  86.9  83.9 
2010  68.0  83.9  10.0  8.1  81.8  0.028  81.0  78.6 
2011  67.0  81.6  8.3  8.4  83.3  0.032  82.1  79.8 
2012  67.5  82.7  9.3  8.8  81.9  0.044  81.6  79.3 
2013  67.2  81.9  7.9  9.3  82.8  0.045  82.2  80.2 
2014  66.8  81.2  8.3  9.0  82.6  0.072  82.3  80.2 
Source:   own calculations on data Statistics Belgium and data from NA (AMECO and NBB.Stat).  
Note:   Net National Income has been calculated as the sum of the net balance of primary incomes in all 5 
sectors. Pre Tax Personal Sector Income is B5n of sectors S14, S11 and S12, and net production taxes. 
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TABLE 8: GROWTH OF NET TAXABLE INCOME (NTI) FOR D10 AND P100 AND COMPARISON WITH GROWTH OF 
RECONSTRUCTED GROSS TAXABLE INCOME (GTI) FOR D10 AND P100 IN % 
year  Income Control 
Total Taxable Income  D10  P100 
NTI  GTI  NTI  GTI  NTI  GTI 
1974    22.3    18.0       
1975    18.2    15.2       
1976    16.1    12.6       
1977    10.2    8.3       
1978    8.1    7.4    5.3   
1979    10.1    7.8    6.8   
1980    9.2    8.9    7.0   
1981    7.6    5.5    0.5   
1982    15.4    6.5    ‐0.5   
1983    2.3    1.1    0.3   
1984    2.6    1.2    ‐4.4   
1985    4.6    6.5    10.4   
1986  4.3  4.2    5.4    7.6   
1987  1.6  2.7    5.3    8.2   
1988  3.7  2.9    3.5    6.5   
1989  5.9  7.2    8.9    12.6   
1990  8.8  5.7    5.5    3.5   
1991  6.2  5.9  5.3  6.2  5.0  7.3  2.8 
1992  5.4  8.0  4.8  7.5  3.7  7.8  1.2 
1993  4.7  3.2  6.4  3.2  7.6  0.0  8.8 
1994  3.7  2.3  8.4  3.1  12.0  3.8  18.4 
1995  ‐0.6  5.2  4.6  5.7  2.4  4.2  1.4 
1996  1.0  3.5  3.1  5.7  4.1  12.2  8.4 
1997  2.8  3.4  3.6  3.8  3.0  0.7  0.3 
1998  3.5  4.0  3.3  5.2  2.7  7.1  2.4 
1999  3.4  4.1  3.7  6.2  4.1  10.0  5.8 
2000  5.2  3.9  3.4  3.8  2.9  2.5  2.6 
2001  4.8  6.8  6.4  9.8  6.7  16.1  9.2 
2002  1.4  4.5  4.3  5.1  1.6  0.1  ‐4.1 
2003  1.3  3.7  3.4  4.9  2.4  3.2  0.8 
2004  2.0  4.9  4.6  7.9  4.3  9.9  6.8 
2005  3.6  3.9  3.4  4.4  3.4  3.4  1.4 
2006  4.4  4.5  4.5  5.2  4.4  6.1  4.7 
2007  4.6  4.4  4.4  5.5  4.6  6.7  4.4 
2008  5.9  5.2  4.6  4.6  3.3  3.5  1.1 
2009  0.2  2.6  2.6  2.3  2.2  2.1  ‐0.5 
2010  1.4  1.4  1.7  0.9  2.8  ‐0.7  3.0 
2011  2.3  4.0  4.1  3.6  3.7  3.9  3.0 
2012  3.0  4.0  3.5  4.0  4.5  4.7  4.6 
2013  1.0  2.7  2.6  2.2  2.2  1.2  1.7 
2014  1.4  4.5    5.2    5.4   
Source:  own calculations based on data obtained from Statistics Belgium and De Standaard.   
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TABLE 9: INCOME COMPONENTS IN THE INCOME CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 
  in million €’s  in % of income control 
Year  Income Control 
Labour 
income 
Replac. 
income 
Inc from 
Property 
Inc. from 
Fin. Ass.  
Labour 
income 
Replac. 
income 
Inc from 
Property 
Inc. from 
Fin. Ass.  
1985  103 733  56 802  25 573  6 956  14 402  54.8  24.7  6.7  13.9 
1986  108 239  58 400  26 636  7 661  15 541  54.0  24.6  7.1  14.4 
1987  109 980  58 658  27 417  8 197  15 708  53.3  24.9  7.5  14.3 
1988  114 062  61 344  28 371  8 969  15 377  53.8  24.9  7.9  13.5 
1989  120 810  66 189  29 595  9 432  15 594  54.8  24.5  7.8  12.9 
1990  131 500  70 931  31 614  9 938  19 016  53.9  24.0  7.6  14.5 
1991  139 636  75 148  33 880  10 989  19 619  53.8  24.3  7.9  14.0 
1992  147 177  77 987  36 087  11 876  21 228  53.0  24.5  8.1  14.4 
1993  154 120  80 058  37 713  13 036  23 313  51.9  24.5  8.5  15.1 
1994  159 838  83 129  38 739  13 945  24 024  52.0  24.2  8.7  15.0 
1995  158 914  82 222  39 886  8 548  28 259  51.7  25.1  5.4  17.8 
1996  160 498  83 627  40 968  8 583  27 320  52.1  25.5  5.3  17.0 
1997  165 043  86 840  42 286  8 783  27 134  52.6  25.6  5.3  16.4 
1998  170 741  89 086  43 617  9 238  28 800  52.2  25.5  5.4  16.9 
1999  176 531  94 502  44 526  9 047  28 455  53.5  25.2  5.1  16.1 
2000  185 734  99 594  45 751  9 604  30 784  53.6  24.6  5.2  16.6 
2001  194 582  104 641  48 166  9 816  31 959  53.8  24.8  5.0  16.4 
2002  197 379  106 707  51 134  9 377  30 162  54.1  25.9  4.8  15.3 
2003  199 914  108 611  52 879  9 209  29 216  54.3  26.5  4.6  14.6 
2004  203 890  111 930  54 580  8 561  28 819  54.9  26.8  4.2  14.1 
2005  211 196  116 260  56 414  9 164  29 357  55.0  26.7  4.3  13.9 
2006  220 505  122 244  58 356  9 659  30 246  55.4  26.5  4.4  13.7 
2007  230 559  127 245  60 783  10 370  32 161  55.2  26.4  4.5  13.9 
2008  244 100  133 246  63 907  9 747  37 200  54.6  26.2  4.0  15.2 
2009  244 703  132 526  68 352  8 347  35 477  54.2  27.9  3.4  14.5 
2010  248 219  134 927  69 732  8 035  35 525  54.4  28.1  3.2  14.3 
2011  253 846  140 687  71 759  7 967  33 434  55.4  28.3  3.1  13.2 
2012  261 472  145 032  75 667  7 369  33 403  55.5  28.9  2.8  12.8 
2013  264 054  147 108  78 461  7 163  31 323  55.7  29.7  2.7  11.9 
2014  267 652  148 716  79 634  7 564  31 739  55.6  29.8  2.8  11.9 
Source:   own calculations based on the National Accounts from NBB.Stat. 
 
  
DECOSTER, DEDOBBELEER & MAES TOP INCOME SHARES BELGIUM 1990-2013 DECEMBER 2017 37 
TABLE 10: GROWTH RATE OF THE INCOME CONTROL AND ITS COMPONENTS 
Year  GDP  Income Control 
Labour 
income 
Replacement 
income 
Income from 
Property 
Income from 
Financial Ass. 
1986  4.7  4.3  2.8  4.2  10.1  7.9 
1987  4.0  1.6  0.4  2.9  7.0  1.1 
1988  7.0  3.7  4.6  3.5  9.4  ‐2.1 
1989  8.4  5.9  7.9  4.3  5.2  1.4 
1990  6.0  8.8  7.2  6.8  5.4  21.9 
1991  4.8  6.2  5.9  7.2  10.6  3.2 
1992  5.0  5.4  3.8  6.5  8.1  8.2 
1993  3.0  4.7  2.7  4.5  9.8  9.8 
1994  5.4  3.7  3.8  2.7  7.0  3.1 
1995  3.7  ‐0.6  ‐1.1  3.0  ‐38.7  17.6 
1996  2.0  1.0  1.7  2.7  0.4  ‐3.3 
1997  4.6  2.8  3.8  3.2  2.3  ‐0.7 
1998  3.8  3.5  2.6  3.1  5.2  6.1 
1999  4.2  3.4  6.1  2.1  ‐2.1  ‐1.2 
2000  5.7  5.2  5.4  2.8  6.2  8.2 
2001  2.9  4.8  5.1  5.3  2.2  3.8 
2002  3.5  1.4  2.0  6.2  ‐4.5  ‐5.6 
2003  2.8  1.3  1.8  3.4  ‐1.8  ‐3.1 
2004  5.7  2.0  3.1  3.2  ‐7.0  ‐1.4 
2005  4.3  3.6  3.9  3.4  7.0  1.9 
2006  4.9  4.4  5.1  3.4  5.4  3.0 
2007  5.5  4.6  4.1  4.2  7.4  6.3 
2008  2.7  5.9  4.7  5.1  ‐6.0  15.7 
2009  ‐1.5  0.2  ‐0.5  7.0  ‐14.4  ‐4.6 
2010  4.7  1.4  1.8  2.0  ‐3.7  0.1 
2011  3.8  2.3  4.3  2.9  ‐0.9  ‐5.9 
2012  2.2  3.0  3.1  5.4  ‐7.5  ‐0.1 
2013  1.4  1.0  1.4  3.7  ‐2.8  ‐6.2 
2014  2.0  1.4  1.1  1.5  5.6  1.3 
Source:   own calculations based on the National Accounts from NBB.Stat. 
 
  
DECOSTER, DEDOBBELEER & MAES TOP INCOME SHARES BELGIUM 1990-2013 DECEMBER 2017 38 
TABLE 11: MISSING INCOME IN % OF THE INCOME CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS BY INCOME 
COMPONENT 
Year  Net Taxable Income 
Gross Taxable 
Income 
Labour 
income 
Replacement 
income 
Income from 
Property 
Income from 
Financial Ass. 
1985  42.7           
1986  42.8           
1987  42.2           
1988  42.6           
1989  42.0           
1990  43.6  33.8  7.5  45.0  63.5  99.3 
1991  43.8  34.4  8.9  44.4  64.2  99.2 
1992  42.4  34.7  8.6  43.9  65.5  99.2 
1993  43.2  33.7  4.5  43.8  68.4  99.3 
1994  44.0  30.7  ‐3.0  46.5  70.9  99.2 
1995  40.8  27.1  ‐6.8  41.3  50.6  99.3 
1996  39.3  25.6  ‐7.0  39.8  43.0  99.3 
1997  38.9  25.0  ‐6.9  39.5  44.7  99.1 
1998  38.6  25.1  ‐7.5  39.2  46.2  99.1 
1999  38.2  24.9  ‐5.5  39.3  42.3  99.0 
2000  38.9  26.2  ‐3.6  39.0  44.6  99.0 
2001  37.7  25.0  ‐4.6  37.4  43.2  98.9 
2002  35.9  22.9  ‐5.9  35.7  40.1  98.8 
2003  34.3  21.3  ‐6.4  33.1  36.9  98.8 
2004  32.5  19.3  ‐6.7  29.7  29.1  98.7 
2005  32.2  19.4  ‐6.5  28.7  39.8  98.8 
2006  32.2  19.4  ‐6.3  28.6  43.6  98.8 
2007  32.3  19.5  ‐7.0  28.8  47.7  98.8 
2008  32.7  20.5  ‐6.7  28.6  44.2  98.7 
2009  31.2  18.6  ‐8.6  28.3  35.9  98.6 
2010  31.2  18.4  ‐8.4  27.8  35.4  98.6 
2011  30.0  16.9  ‐8.3  27.0  34.6  98.3 
2012  29.3  16.5  ‐7.8  27.6  30.6  95.3 
2013  28.1  15.1  ‐8.7  26.8  27.3  96.8 
2014  25.9           
Source:   own calculations based on data obtained from Statistics Belgium. 
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TABLE 12: INCOME SHARES FOR D10 BASED ON PUBLISHED DATA FOR NET TAXABLE INCOME (NTI) AND 
DIFFERENT CORRECTIONS OF GROSS TAXABLE INCOME (GTI) 
Year  NTI  GTI  GTI lower bound 
GTI 
upper bound 
GTI adjusted by 
income 
component 
1977  29.6         
1978  29.5         
1979  28.8         
1980  28.8         
1981  28.2         
1982  26.0         
1983  25.7         
1984  25.4         
1985  25.8         
1986  26.1         
1987  26.8         
1988  26.9         
1989  27.4         
1990  27.3  36.4  24.1  57.9  74.7 
1991  27.4  36.3  23.8  58.2  74.0 
1992  27.3  35.9  23.4  58.1  73.8 
1993  27.3  36.3  24.0  57.8  77.7 
1994  27.5  37.5  26.0  56.6  83.3 
1995  27.7  36.7  26.8  53.8  70.3 
1996  28.3  37.1  27.6  53.2  68.1 
1997  28.4  36.9  27.6  52.7  67.7 
1998  28.7  36.6  27.4  52.6  67.2 
1999  29.3  36.8  27.6  52.5  65.6 
2000  29.2  36.6  27.0  53.2  64.7 
2001  30.0  36.7  27.5  52.6  65.1 
2002  30.2  35.8  27.6  50.5  63.0 
2003  30.5  35.4  27.9  49.1  61.2 
2004  31.4  35.3  28.5  47.8  59.4 
2005  31.6  35.3  28.4  47.9  63.3 
2006  31.8  35.3  28.4  47.8  65.0 
2007  32.1  35.4  28.5  48.0  67.8 
2008  32.0  34.9  27.8  48.3  65.8 
2009  31.9  34.8  28.3  46.9  62.9 
2010  31.7  35.1  28.7  47.1  63.6 
2011  31.5  35.0  29.1  46.0  63.1 
2012  31.5  35.3  29.5  46.0  60.5 
2013  31.4  35.2  29.9  45.0  59.2 
2014  31.6         
Note:  The difference between net taxable income (NTI) and gross taxable income (GTI) consists both in adding 
the deductions, and redefining the top decile by adding zeroes at the bottom. The lower bound is obtained 
by adding all missing income to deciles 1‐9, the upper bound by adding all missing income to the top decile. 
The rightmost column uses a correction as described in equation (13) of Appendix 2, based on shares of the 
four income components for the top decile of 20%, 5%, 30% and 45% for labour income, replacement 
income, income from property and income from financial assets respectively, compared with an average 
share of 54%, 26%, 5.4% and 14.6% (average in the income control over the period 1985‐2014). 
Source: own calculations based on data obtained from Statistics Belgium. 
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TABLE 13: INCOME SHARES FOR P100 BASED ON PUBLISHED DATA FOR NET TAXABLE INCOME (NTI) AND 
DIFFERENT CORRECTIONS OF GROSS TAXABLE INCOME (GTI) 
Year  NTI  GTI  GTI lower bound 
GTI 
upper bound 
GTI adjusted by 
income 
component 
1977  7.5         
1978  7.3         
1979  7.1         
1980  7.0         
1981  6.5         
1982  5.6         
1983  5.5         
1984  5.1         
1985  5.4         
1986  5.6         
1987  5.9         
1988  6.1         
1989  6.4         
1990  6.3  9.2  6.1  39.9  24.4 
1991  6.3  9.0  5.9  40.3  23.6 
1992  6.3  8.6  5.6  40.4  23.2 
1993  6.1  8.8  5.9  39.6  25.2 
1994  6.2  9.7  6.7  37.4  29.5 
1995  6.2  9.4  6.8  33.9  22.6 
1996  6.7  9.8  7.3  32.9  22.2 
1997  6.5  9.5  7.1  32.2  21.6 
1998  6.7  9.4  7.1  32.2  21.5 
1999  7.1  9.6  7.2  32.2  21.0 
2000  7.0  9.6  7.1  33.3  20.7 
2001  7.6  9.8  7.4  32.4  21.3 
2002  7.3  9.0  7.0  29.9  19.3 
2003  7.2  8.8  6.9  28.2  18.3 
2004  7.6  9.0  7.2  26.5  17.8 
2005  7.5  8.8  7.1  26.5  19.1 
2006  7.7  8.8  7.1  26.5  19.9 
2007  7.8  8.8  7.1  26.6  21.0 
2008  7.7  8.5  6.8  27.3  19.7 
2009  7.7  8.3  6.7  25.4  18.0 
2010  7.5  8.4  6.8  25.2  18.2 
2011  7.5  8.3  6.9  23.8  17.9 
2012  7.5  8.4  7.0  23.5  16.8 
2013  7.4  8.3  7.0  22.2  16.3 
2014  7.5         
Note:  The difference between net taxable income (NTI) and gross taxable income (GTI) consists both of adding 
the deductions, and redefining the top percentile by adding zeroes at the bottom. The lower bound is 
obtained by adding all missing income to percentile 1‐99, the upper bound by adding all missing income to 
the top percentile. The rightmost column uses a correction as described in equation (13) of Appendix 2, 
based on shares of the four income components for the top percentile of 10%, 5%, 35% and 50% for labour 
income, replacement income, income from property and income from financial assets, compared with an 
average share of 54%, 26%, 5.4% and 14.6% (average in the income control over the period 1985‐2014). 
Source: own calculations based on data obtained from Statistics Belgium. 
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TABLE 14: COMPARISON OF D10 GTI-INCOME SHARES WITH SELECTED OTHER COUNTRIES 
Year  Belgium  France  Netherlands  Germany  UK  US 
  Lower Bound  proportional           
1973      34.2  28.4    28.3  35.0 
1974      33.8    31.0  28.1  34.1 
1975      33.3  27.5    27.8  34.4 
1976      32.8      27.9  34.3 
1977      31.2  27.8  31.7  28.0  34.8 
1978      30.5      27.8  34.7 
1979      31.4      28.4  34.9 
1980      30.6    31.9    34.2 
1981      30.2  28.5    31.0  34.7 
1982      29.3      31.2  34.9 
1983      29.4    31.4  31.8  35.4 
1984      29.7      32.5  36.7 
1985      30.3  29.1    32.7  36.7 
1986      31.2    32.1  32.9  36.5 
1987      32.1      33.3  37.6 
1988      32.6      34.2  38.9 
1989      32.8  28.5  33.5  34.2  38.7 
1990  24.1  36.4  32.2  28.2    36.9  38.7 
1991  23.8  36.3  32.1  28.1    37.7  38.6 
1992  23.4  35.9  31.4  28.0  33.5  37.6  39.8 
1993  24.0  36.3  31.7  28.0    38.3  39.6 
1994  26.0  37.5  31.8  28.3    38.3  39.9 
1995  26.8  36.7  31.7  28.5  31.8  38.5  40.7 
1996  27.6  37.1  32.2  28.2    39.3  41.5 
1997  27.6  36.9  32.5  28.2    38.9  42.3 
1998  27.4  36.6  32.8  28.0  35.5  39.5  42.6 
1999  27.6  36.8  32.7  28.1    41.3  43.4 
2000  27.0  36.6  33.1  28.0    41.0  43.9 
2001  27.5  36.7  33.4  29.7  36.2  41.4  42.8 
2002  27.6  35.8  32.9  29.8  36.1  41.0  42.7 
2003  27.9  35.4  33.2  29.8  35.5  41.4  42.9 
2004  28.5  35.3  33.5  30.4  36.0  40.8  43.9 
2005  28.4  35.3  33.4  30.7  38.5  41.6  45.1 
2006  28.4  35.3  33.2  30.8  38.4  42.0  46.0 
2007  28.5  35.4  33.9  31.7  39.5  42.6  45.8 
2008  27.8  34.9  33.7  30.7  40.0    45.3 
2009  28.3  34.8  32.2  30.6  39.8  41.5  44.3 
2010  28.7  35.1  32.6  30.7  39.7  38.1  45.8 
2011  29.1  35.0  33.2  30.6  39.0  39.2  45.9 
2012  29.5  35.3  32.2  30.9    39.1  47.1 
2013  29.9  35.2  32.6      41.3  46.3 
2014      32.6      40.0  47.0 
Source: Belgium: own calculations based on data obtained from Statistics Belgium, other countries: WID. 
Note:   Note: The lower bound is obtained by allocating all missing income to the first 9 deciles; in the column 
with ‘proportional’ the missing income is allocated in proportion to gross taxable income. 
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TABLE 15: COMPARISON OF P100 GTI-INCOME SHARES WITH SELECTED OTHER COUNTRIES 
Year  Belgium  France  Netherlands  Germany  UK  US 
  Lower Bound  Proportional           
1973      10.1  6.9    7.0  11.0 
1974      9.7    10.4  6.5  10.6 
1975      9.1  6.1    6.1  10.6 
1976      9.1      5.9  10.4 
1977      8.5  6.0  10.4  5.9  10.8 
1978      8.3      5.7  10.6 
1979      8.6      5.9  11.2 
1980      8.2    10.7    10.7 
1981      8.2  5.9    6.7  11.1 
1982      7.5      6.9  11.3 
1983      7.3    9.9  6.8  11.5 
1984      7.5      7.2  12.5 
1985      7.7  5.9    7.4  12.6 
1986      8.2    10.5  7.6  12.2 
1987      9.0      7.8  13.3 
1988      9.2      8.6  14.9 
1989      9.5  5.7  11.4  8.7  14.5 
1990  6.1  9.2  9.3  5.6    9.8  14.5 
1991  5.9  9.0  9.1  5.5    10.3  13.9 
1992  5.6  8.6  8.6  5.5  10.6  9.9  15.0 
1993  5.9  8.8  9.1  5.2    10.4  14.6 
1994  6.7  9.7  9.2  5.3    10.6  14.7 
1995  6.8  9.4  9.2  5.4  9.2  10.8  15.3 
1996  7.3  9.8  10.0  5.4    11.9  16.0 
1997  7.1  9.5  10.4  5.5    12.1  16.6 
1998  7.1  9.4  10.7  5.3  11.9  12.5  16.9 
1999  7.2  9.6  10.6  5.4    13.2  17.7 
2000  7.1  9.6  11.0  5.6    13.5  18.3 
2001  7.4  9.8  11.3  6.6  11.4  13.4  17.3 
2002  7.0  9.0  10.9  6.5  11.1  13.0  17.1 
2003  6.9  8.8  11.4  6.4  10.5  13.2  17.2 
2004  7.2  9.0  11.6  6.7  11.1  13.3  18.3 
2005  7.1  8.8  11.5  6.8  12.9  14.2  19.4 
2006  7.1  8.8  11.2  6.8  13.2  14.8  20.1 
2007  7.1  8.8  11.7  7.6  14.0  15.4  19.9 
2008  6.8  8.5  11.6  6.8  14.5    19.5 
2009  6.7  8.3  10.2  6.4  13.2  15.4  18.5 
2010  6.8  8.4  10.8  6.4  13.1  12.6  19.8 
2011  6.9  8.3  11.5  6.3  13.0  12.9  19.6 
2012  7.0  8.4  10.4  6.3    12.7  20.8 
2013  7.0  8.3  10.8      14.5  19.6 
2014      10.8      13.9  20.2 
Source: Belgium: own calculations based on data obtained from Statistics Belgium, other countries: WID. 
Note:   The lower bound is obtained by allocating all missing income to the first 99 percentiles; in the column with 
‘proportional’ the missing income is allocated in proportion to gross taxable income. 
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APPENDIX 2: HOW TO ALLOCATE MISSING INCOME ACROSS THE DISTRIBUTION 
Let us denote the income share for percentile p, as observed in the fiscal data as: 
 
F
p
p F
Y
w
Y
 , (1) 
where FY  stands for aggregate income in the fiscal data, and FpY  aggregate fiscal income for income 
group p. The income control NAY , derived from the national accounts, differs from aggregate fiscal 
income FY , by missing income Z : 
 NA FZ Y Y  , (2) 
and the missing income for percentile p is denoted as pZ . The question is how the observed income 
share pw  relates to the ‘true’ or corrected income share p : 
 
F
p p
p NA
Y Z
Y
  , (3) 
obtained by adding part of the missing income to percentile p, and assuming — for the ease of 
exposition — that there is no reranking. 
If we define   as missing income, expressed as a proportion of the income control: 
 NA
Z
Y
  , (4) 
and the unobserved missing income proportion as 
 pp NA
p
Z
Y
  , (5) 
then the corrected income share p  can be rewritten as follows: 
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1
11
1 .1
F F
p p p
p pF NA F
p
p p
p
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p
Y Z ZY w
Y Y Y
w w
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 
 


         
       
     
, (6) 
In the text we distinguished three possibilities. 
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Case 1: lower bound on the corrected income shares 
If no missing income is allocated to percentile p, the third line of equation (6) reads as: 
  1 .p pw    (7) 
This might partially explain the evolution of the lower bound of corrected share in the text. 31 Since the 
fraction of the income control which is missing sharply declines over time, the correction factor 1   
increases, and might produce an increasing top income share, only because of the changing correction 
factor. 
Case 2: upper bound on the corrected income shares 
If all missing income is allocated to percentile p, the corrected income share becomes: 
 
 
 
 
1
1 .1
1
F F F
p p
p NA F NA
p F
p
p p
Y Z Y Z Y
Y Y Y
Zw
Y
w
w w


 

   
      
      
  
 (8) 
Again, this illustrates how the pronounced decline of the upper bound of the corrected income share 
might have at least as much to do with the decline in the missing income (which, as explained in the 
text, itself seems to have to do more with the income control than with the evolution of filed income), 
as with a change in the share of fiscal income pw . 
Case 3: corrected income shares are equal to the observed shares in the fiscal data 
If we assume that the proportion of missing income is the same across the income distribution, i.e. 
p  , then the third line of equation (6) reads as: 
 ,p pw   (9) 
and the income shares observed in the fiscal data do not have to be corrected. The assumption boils 
down to distributing the missing income in proportion to the corrected income distribution: 
                                                     
31  We write ‘partially explain’ since the assumption of absence of re-ranking will probably be violated if 
we allocate all missing income to the income groups outside the top income group (i.e. the top income 
group will no longer be the top income group). 
DECOSTER, DEDOBBELEER & MAES TOP INCOME SHARES BELGIUM 1990-2013 DECEMBER 2017 45 
 
p
p NA NA
p
NA
p
p NA
Z Z
Y Y
Y
Z Z
Y
   
  
 (10) 
Finally, we have also explored possibilities to allocate missing income differently for the four different 
income components (labour income, replacement income, income from property and income from 
financial assets). The numerator 1   of the correction factor in the third line of equation (6) can be 
decomposed as a weighted average of missing income fractions for all k income components, where 
the weights are the shares k  of the k income components in the income control: 
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  (11) 
where the superscript k is used for income component k. Analogously, we can also write the 
denominator 1 p  of the correction factor in the third line of equation (6) as a weighted average of 
missing income fractions for all k income components, but now specific for this percentile group p as: 
  1 1 ,k kp p p
k
        (12) 
where the kp ’s denote the missing income fractions within percentile p for income component k, and 
k
p  the share of income component k in the income control aggregate for percentile p. With this 
decomposition, equation (6), which relates the corrected income share to the observed one then 
becomes: 
 
 
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11 ,1 1
k k
k
p p p k k
p p p
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w w
    
    

  (13) 
which allows us to make some more elaborate corrections to the observed shares. 
We have no information on kp  and kp . But we can e.g. assume k kp p   , i.e. within a specific 
income component, the missing income is distributed according to the shares of this component. This 
certainly is a weaker assumption than the one above ( p p   ), because it only holds for a 
specific component. In that case, assumptions about the income composition of a given percentile p are 
sufficient to calculate the correction factors on the shares. Evidently, if one also assumes 
k k
p p   , the case again melts down to: no correction needed. But if we assume specific shares 
(e.g. 10 10 10 100.20; 0.10; 0.30; 0.40labour repl prop fin       ), then we can calculate corrected shares.  
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The result of these benchmark cases of allocating the missing income is presented in Table 12 and 
Table 13 of Appendix 1 (in which the rightmost column of these two tables gives the allocation based 
on the assumption that missing income is distributed proportionately to the four income components, 
but that the weight of the four income components is different). The result of the first three benchmark 
cases of allocating the missing income is displayed in Figure 14 (for the top decile) and Figure 15 (for 
the top percentile). 
FIGURE 14: TOP DECILE INCOME SHARES AFTER CORRECTION FOR MISSING INCOME 
 
Source:  Table 12 in Appendix 1 
Note: The series of gross taxable income (GTI) differs from the series of net taxable income (NTI), by both adding the 
deductions, inserting zeroes at the bottom to comply with the population control, and allocating missing income. 
For the lower bound of the income share all missing income is added to deciles 1-9; for the upper bound all 
missing income is added to decile 10. The other line labelled ‘GTI’ replicates the series in figure 10 and rests on 
the assumption that the missing income is distributed proportionately to the income shares across the income 
distribution. 
The results show that the assumption about how to allocate the missing income is absolutely crucial to 
state on whether the income shares of the top income groups have increased or decreased. It is indeed 
possible to produce an increasing share for both the top decile and the top percentile, but only when we 
allocate the missing income disproportionately outside these income groups, which is quite an 
unrealistic assumption. Moreover, the other side of the coin is that this assumption leads to a low level 
of the top decile income share as compared to other countries (see Figure 12 in Section 4.3). 
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FIGURE 15: TOP PERCENTILE INCOME SHARES AFTER CORRECTION FOR MISSING INCOME 
 
Source:  Table 13 in Appendix 1 
Mutatis mutandis, we reach the same conclusion for the top percentile in Figure 15. The visibility of 
the evolution of the income share for the top percentile becomes a bit obscured due to the scaling of the 
vertical axis since it has to accommodate the very high level of the top income share under the 
assumption that all missing income would belong to the top percentile (the upper bound). This is of 
course an increasingly unrealistic assumption as we focus on smaller groups at the top. But, contrary to 
the analysis for the top decile, even the lower bound of the top percentile share is now no longer 
increasing, except at the very beginning of the period. 
APPENDIX 3: ESTIMATE OF THE PARETO PARAMETER ON THE TABULATED DATA 
The published NTI data only contain average income by decile or percentile; moreover the quantile 
values are unobserved. By assuming the right tail of the income distribution to be Pareto distributed, 
we are able to recover both these quantile values and the underlying Pareto parameter.32 When the latter 
parameter has been estimated, we assess to the impact of adding zero income observations on the top 
income shares by means of a closed-form expression. 
Estimation of the quantile values and the Pareto parameter 
If we assume a Pareto distribution f  for the right tail of the income distribution, it holds that for 
all incomes v and w larger than the Pareto scale parameter k , with v w , 
                                                     
32 The pdf of the Pareto distribution is as follows: 1 ,( )
0,
y k
f y y
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in which / ( 1)    denotes the Pareto shape parameter. The right-hand side is the closed form 
expression for the average income between income levels v and w .  
As the Pareto distribution is only applicable to right tail of the income distribution, we only use 
information from the set I of top percentiles. As mentioned before, in the administrative tabulations 
we observe the average income   for every percentile i I . Making use of expression (14) this 
translates into 
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in which iq   denotes percentile i ’s unobserved lower bound and iq  its unobserved upper bound. 
Note that by the structure of the problem ( 1)i iq q   . Since the left-hand side of equation (15) is 
observed in the tabulations, this yields a system of | |I equations and | | 1I  unknowns.  
To identify all parameters we exploit that the income share from percentile i  onwards can also be 
calculated from the tabulations,  
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This adds another | | 1I   restrictions without adding new unknowns. As we now have more equations 
than unknowns, the Pareto-parameter can be recovered by jointly minimizing the distance between the 
observed left-hand side and the unobserved right-hand side for every equation. The result is found in 
Table 2. 
Estimation of income shares after adding zeros at the bottom 
When zero income observations are added at the bottom of the income distribution, the quantile 
value of a given percentile p drops, causing its income share to rise. Again, let k denote the scale 
parameter of the Pareto distribution, and let  denote the fraction of people whose income is 
modelled by the Pareto distribution before the addition of the zeros. Let ) /( F Z FNN N  denote 
the ratio of the new population with respect to the old population, in which FN  stands for the 
number of observations in the fiscal dataset and ZN  for the number of zeroes added at the bottom. 
Let (100 1) /100p    , in which p  is the percentile of interest. The lower bound pq  of the 
top percentile before adding the zero observations is given by 
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 , (17) 
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or alternatively 
 
1/
pq k


      . (18) 
After adding the zeros the Pareto density function drops with factor 1  , such that the new lower 
bound zpq should satisfy 
 1 z
p
k
q
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 , (19) 
or alternatively 
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Rearranging equations (18) and (20) expresses the new lower bound as a rescaling of the old lower 
bound  
 1/zp pqq    . (21) 
The new top income share then follows immediately: 
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The shares displayed as the grey lines in figure 10 and Figure 11 are calculated by means of (22). 
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